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Abstract
The thesis attempts to evaluate three Indian development policies aimed at promoting women and histori-
cally disadvantaged social groups. These policies are: job reservation for women in public workfare programs;
women's political representation in the Indian state assemblies; political reservation in the state assemblies
for historically disadvantaged social groups. The thesis evaluates the three distinct policies in three research
papers. The outcomes of the policies could impact various development goals. The ﬁrst two papers focus on
the development policies' eﬀects on children welfare. The third paper focuses on several business outcomes,
including those of Scheduled Caste entrepreneurs.
The ﬁrst paper (co-authored with Ritam Chaurey) examines the impact of the Indian employment guar-
antee program (MGNREGA - Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) on the welfare
of preschool aged children. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation stemming from the staggered roll-out
of the program between 2006-2007 across districts of India, we ﬁnd that MGNREGA resulted in a decrease
in the number of meals for pre-school and school-going children.
The second paper (co-authored with Francesco Burchi) has two main objectives: (1) to analyze whether
the gender of politicians in India inﬂuences the educational attainments of the residents of the districts in
which they were elected; (2) to test whether politicians are more sensitive to the needs of people of the
same gender. Our results show that a 10 percentage increase in women's political representation produces a
6 percentage increase in the probability that children will complete primary school. We then found gender-
diﬀerentiated results: that women's political representation aﬀects the education of girls signiﬁcantly more
than that of boys.
The third paper examines the existence of preference in the constituency works of political leaders elected
through the Scheduled Castes (SC) electoral quotas. The paper examines the possible business outcomes in
the private non-agricultural sectors that directly aﬀect the welfare of the Scheduled Castes as well as other
castes. These include: entrepreneurship; entrepreneurs' access to public utilities; entrepreneurs' dependence
on family labour sectoral mobility; employment of SC in other caste enterprises; SC entrepreneurs' ability
to hire labor from other castes and political patronage. It ﬁnds that constituency works of SC leaders do
not promote inclusion of SC members in the private sector businesses nor do they aﬀect the overall business
outcomes of the other castes. However, this study ﬁnds that SC leaders are involved in patronage in the
rent-seeking sectors.
I
Abstract
German
Die folgende These evaluiert drei indische Entwicklungspolitiken, dessen Ziel die Förderung von Frauen
und historisch benachteiligten sozialen Gruppen ist. Diese drei Konzepte sind: der Vorbehalt für Frauen in
öﬀentlichen Arbeitsprogrammen; politische Repräsentierung von Frauen in den indischen Staatsversammlun-
gen; politischer Vorbehalt in den Landesversammlungen gegenüber historisch benachteiligten Gesellschafts-
gruppen. Die Dissertation bewertet die drei verschiedenen Richtlinien in drei Forschungsarbeiten. Die Ergeb-
nisse der politischen Maßnahmen könnten sich auf verschiedene Entwicklungsziele auswirken. Die ersten bei-
den Studien befassen sich mit den Auswirkungen der Entwicklungspolitik auf das Wohlergehen der Kinder.
Das dritte Papier konzentriert sich auf verschiedene Geschäftsergebnisse, einschließlich der Ergebnisse von
Scheduled Castes (SC).
Die erste Studie (gemeinsam mit Ritam Chaurey verfasst) untersucht die Auswirkungen des indischen
Beschäftigungsgarantieprogramms (MGNREGA - Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act) auf das Wohlergehen von Kindern im Vorschulalter. Anhand einer Diﬀerenz-zu-Diﬀerenz-Speziﬁkation,
die sich aus der gestaﬀelten Einführung des Programms zwischen 2006 und 2007 in verschiedenen Distrikten
Indiens ergibt, stellen wir fest, dass MGNREGA zu einer Verringerung der Anzahl der Mahlzeiten für Vor-
und Schulkinder geführt hat.
Die zweite Studie (gemeinsam mit Francesco Burchi verfasst) verfolgt zwei Hauptziele: (1) zu analysieren,
ob das Geschlecht der Politiker in Indien das Bildungsniveau der Bewohner der Bezirke beeinﬂusst, in denen
sie gewählt wurden; (2) zu testen, ob Politiker sensibler für die Bedürfnisse von Menschen gleichen Geschlechts
sind. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine 10-prozentige Zunahme der politischen Repräsentation von Frauen
eine 6-prozentige Erhöhung der Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Folge hat, dass Kinder die Grundschule abschließen.
Folglich fanden wir geschlechtsspeziﬁsche Ergebnisse: die politische Handlungsfreiheit von Frauen beeinﬂusst
die Bildung von Mädchen stärker, als die von Jungen.
Die dritte Studie untersucht die Existenz von Bevorzugung bei nichtlegislativen Aktionen von politischen
Führungspersonen, die durch die Wahlquoten der Scheduled Castes (SC) gewählt wurden. Die Studie unter-
sucht die möglichen Geschäftsergebnisse im privaten nichtlandwirtschaftlichen Sektor, die sich direkt auf den
Wohlstand der Scheduled Castes und anderer Kasten auswirken. Dazu gehören: die Geschäftsführung; der
Zugang von Unternehmern zu öﬀentlichen Versorgungseinrichtungen; die Abhängigkeit der Unternehmer von
der wirtschaftsfachlichen Mobilität der Familienarbeitskräfte; Beschäftigung von SC in Unternehmen anderer
Kasten; die Fähigkeit von SC-Unternehmern, Arbeitskräfte von anderen Kasten einzustellen und politis-
che Schirmherrschaft. Die Analyse zeigt, dass nichtlegislative Handlungen der SC-Führungskräfte weder die
Einbeziehung von SC-Mitgliedern in die Unternehmen des privaten Sektors fördern, noch die allgemeinen
Geschäftsergebnisse der anderen Kasten beeinﬂussen. Die Studie stellt jedoch fest, dass die führenden Poli-
tiker des SC an der politischen Schirmherrschaft in den rentenorientierten Sektoren beteiligt sind.
II
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Stephen Klasen for his patience, moti-
vation, and immense knowledge. Prof. Klasen was always available and provided continuous support during
my PhD. I cannot imagine having a better advisor and mentor. I further thank my subsidiary supervisors
Prof. David Blakeslee, and Prof. Sebastian Vollmer, for their helpful and motivating comments and agreeing
to be on my committee.
I would also like to thank my colleagues from two institutions. From the Center for Development Research
(ZEF), I would like to thank Prof. Joachim von Braun, Prof. Guido Lüchters, Dr. Benjamin Schraven, Dr.
Günther Manske and Mrs. Maike Retat-Amin. From the German Development Institute (GDI), I would like to
thank Dr. Tilman Altenburg, Dr. Markus Loewe, and Dr. Francesco Burchi, who provided me an opportunity
to join their team as a researcher, access to their research facilities, and for their insightful comments and
encouragement. Without their precious support, it would not have been possible to conduct this research.
I would like to thank several of my friends and batchmates from the Bonn International Graduate School
for Development Research (BIGS-DR) at ZEF. I would also like to thank all of my colleagues from the
Development Economics Department at the University of Göttingen for their help and support. Thanks to
Anna Gyorgy for proofreading.
My sincere thanks to Prof. David Blakeslee and Prof. Ritam Chaurey for their guidance, research collab-
oration, and the many discussions during my PhD which I greatly beneﬁted from.
I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and understanding while writing this thesis
and last but not least my beloved.
III
Contents
Contents 2
1 Introduction 7
2 Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and Child Nutrition: Evidence from India 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 MGNREGA Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 MGNREGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3 Women's political representation and educational attainments: A district-level analysis
in India 34
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Women's Representation in Politics, Policy-making and Development Outcomes . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Women's political representation and policy-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Development outputs and outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 The Political Economy of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1
3.4 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.2 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4.3 Estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5.1 From politics to educational outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5.2 From politics to educational inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4 Political Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Business Exclusion: Examining Political
Quotas' Eﬀects on Private Sector Entrepreneurship,1990 to 2007 59
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Background on Caste, Politics, and Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Empirical Design and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.1 Empirical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.1 Private sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.2 Entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4.3 Access to facilities and government support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.4 Family workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.5 Business presence in traditional exploitative sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.6 Business sector and patronage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.7 Caste and employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4.8 Intra-village eﬀect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.9 Public sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2
Bibliography
3
List of Figures
2.1 Meals intake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Estimated coeﬃcient plots for number of meals for diﬀerent age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Trends in people's probability to complete primary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4
List of Tables
2.1 Pre-program Summary Statistics for Phase 1 and Phase 2 Districts (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Testing for parallel trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 MGNREGA impact on the meals intake of rural children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Households' landholding size: Impact on children of diﬀerent age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Impact on households during dry and rainy season . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8 Impact on quality of food (food diversiﬁcation) of households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.9 Impact on the meals intake of rural children: household size and women in the family . . . . 31
2.10 Impact on children from urban households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Eﬀect of women's political representation on primary education completion . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3a Tests for the validity of the instrumental variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3b First stage of the instrumental variable estimates (Table 3.2 column (2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Eﬀect of women's political representation on primary education completion: disaggregated
results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Eﬀect of women's political representation on educational infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Eﬀect of women's political representation on Mid Day Meal scheme coverage . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Eﬀect of SC reservation on the private sector, SCs participation and overall economic growth 73
4.3 Eﬀect of SC reservation on entrepreneurship of SC enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5
4.4 Eﬀect of SC reservation on access to facilities and government support of SC enterprises . . . 77
4.5 Eﬀect of SC reservation on family labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6 Eﬀect of SC reservation on traditional exploitative sector(Number of ﬁrms . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 Eﬀect of SC reservation on across business sector (SC ﬁrms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.8 Eﬀect of SC reservation on across business sector (employment in SC ﬁrms) . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.9 Eﬀect of SC reservation on across business sector (non-SC ﬁrms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.10 Eﬀect of SC reservation on across business sector (employment in non-SC ﬁrms) . . . . . . . 87
4.11 Eﬀect of SC reservation on ﬁrms' hiring patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.12 Intra-village eﬀect of SC reservation on the private sector, SCs participation and overall eco-
nomic growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.13 Eﬀect of SC reservation on the public sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis attempts to evaluate three Indian development policies aimed at promoting women
and historically disadvantaged social groups. These policies are: job reservation for women
in public workfare programs, women's political representation within the Indian state assem-
blies, and political reservation in the state assemblies for historically disadvantaged social
groups. The thesis evaluates these distinct policies in three research papers. All three papers
are chieﬂy connected in the ﬁeld of development economics and share three characteristics; a
focus on socially weaker groups - women and lower castes, a robust empirical approach, and
all explore important policy implications. Each paper is discussed below along with the main
motivation, arguments, and implications.
Essay 1: Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
and Child Nutrition: Evidence from India
Women are the principle development agents for their infants and children. The devel-
opment goals related to child welfare depend on the status of women in society (UNICEF,
2006; Kabeer, 2008). Women's allocation of time can increase the welfare of children via two
channels: the income from paid work, and the time spent directly in the household with chil-
dren or on other domestic activities. Women's time allotment on household activities such
as meal preparation, breastfeeding, and seeking preventive and curative medical care is vital
for infants and children's health Hoﬀman (1989).
Without government intervention, women have less opportunities to contribute via the in-
come channel. Rural women in developing countries encounter several barriers when trying to
participate in paid employment outside the household. The most common are: lack of control
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over assets, low skills or education levels, gender inequality in domestic duties, and stereo-
typing of women's capabilities (Ashraﬁ, 2009; Vigneri and Holmes, 2009; Luci et al., 2012;
Hambly and Sarapura, 2009). Therefore, developing countries are increasingly intervening in
their labour market in order to increase the number of women in the labour force.
For a long history, India has been among one of the developing countries that has excluded
women in mainstream economic activities. The Indian government has committed to erase
the historic barriers that exclude women. Recently, this has been illustrated in the world's
largest public works program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA). Through this program, one third of total jobs are reserved for women.
The program also takes into account women's contribution to their children via domestic
duties. Therefore, the MGNREGA program promises to provide adequate childcare services
for their women workers.
This essay (co-authored with Ritam Chaurey) critically examines the impact of MGN-
REGA on children's welfare via time-intensive inputs. Does the women's participation in the
programme aﬀect the time-intensive input toward children? The phased rollout of the pro-
gram allows us to conduct a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation to shed light on the question.
We use the number of meals eaten by children as a proxy for time allocated by the mother for
child care. We ﬁnd that the number of meals for preschool and school-aged children decreased
by 2.3 percent and 3.0 percent, respectively.
Several studies provided evidence of positive impacts on children from the income gener-
ated by participation in the programme (Afridi et al., 2012; Islam and Sivasankaran, 2014;
Bose, 2017; Maity, 2015; Shah and Steinberg, 2015). However, relatively less attention has
been given to the time eﬀect (substitution eﬀect) of the programme. Chari et al. (2019) are
the ﬁrst to examine the eﬀect of MGNREGA on women's time allotment towards childcare.
The study ﬁnds that women participating in the public works programme reduced prenatal
care and breastfeeding. Our study complements this paper by focusing on the time eﬀect
of the programme. Our study suggests that adequate public investment in childcare services
at the workplace may alleviate the potential tradeoﬀs between mothers earning additional
income and child welfare.
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Essay 2: Women's political representation and
educational attainments: A district-level analysis
in India
During the past two decades, a growing body of literature has investigated the eﬀects
of women's political representation on a range of economic, political, and social indicators.
In the literature on political economy, the 'citizen-candidate model' views the identity of
politicians as being one of the fundamental determinants of investment choices (Osborne
and Slivinski, 1996). Building on this model, scholars have investigated the speciﬁc role
played by a politician's gender in policy-making: men and women are assumed to have
diﬀerent preferences, and this is taken as the reason why they make diﬀerent choices once
they obtain political representation. While most of the existing literature focuses on the
lowest administrative level, i.e the Gram panchayat or on the states, our analysis looks at
the relationship within Indian districts. District politics have not been examined in great
detail thus far. The fact that the Indian parliament is currently debating the possibility of
reserving a proportion of seats in state assemblies for women is another important reason for
focusing on India.
This essay (co-authored with Francesco Burchi) tries to answer three questions. The ﬁrst
one is: Does women's political representation have a positive eﬀect on primary education
completion rates? Our aim is to test if women prioritise education and try to divert more
resources to this sector. If so, this should be reﬂected by higher school completion rates.
As of this publication, there has been little research exploring this topic To the best of
our knowledge, only one paper (Clots-Figueras, 2012) has studied this relationship in India.
Clots-Figueras (2012) studies the period between 1970 and 1992. In the late 1990s, many
other state governments allocated discretionary funds to MLAs, known as the MLA Local
Area Development Scheme Fund (MLALADS). This fund has given space to politicians to
execute preferred polices at their constituency. Our study explores the post-political reform
period and covers the years 1970-2002.
The two remaining research questions are: a) Do women's political representation aﬀect
girls' probability of attaining primary education more than boys'? (This veriﬁes whether
female politicians prioritise the education of girls over boys) and b) What are the possible
channels through which women's political representation aﬀects educational achievements?
Given data constraints, we investigated only a few possible channels, such as the availability
of schools - examined in previous studies - and the coverage of the Mid-Day Meal (MDM)
scheme, which has not been explored in the literature.
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Our study follows the identiﬁcation strategy of Clots-Figueras (2012). In order to overcome
a major 'omitted variables' bias - due to the fact that more progressive districts are more likely
to have more women in political bodies and to invest more in education - our econometric
strategy is based on an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Thus, the proportion of district
seats won by women was instrumented by the proportion of district seats won by women in
close male-female contests, i.e. in elections in which there was a narrow gap between the
winner and the runner-up.
Our ﬁndings show that a 10% increase in women's political representation at district level
can produce a rise of nearly 6% in the likelihood of an individual completing the full cycle of
primary education. The study of Clots-Figueras (2012), from which we took the identiﬁcation
strategy, focused only on the importance of women's political representation in urban areas.
A disaggregated analysis reveals that women's political representation raises the educational
achievements of girls signiﬁcantly more than that of boys. This is a completely novel result,
as this aspect had never been examined in previous works.
Finally, we investigated two possible macro-channels through which women's political
representation might aﬀect educational outcomes, speciﬁcally, the presence of school buildings
and the coverage of the MDM scheme Our results show that the ﬁrst channel does not help
to explain the relationship. In contrast, we detect a positive, though insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of
women's political representation on the MDM coverage and, above all, some positive and
signiﬁcant evidence for the sample of girls. This suggests that female politicians may be
particularly interested in girls' education.
The research ﬁndings are complementing two broad areas of research. First, it is contribut-
ing to the research from (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2012; Clots-Figueras, 2012) by providing
evidence of women political leaders commitment to improve the educational outcomes. Sec-
ond it is contributing to the citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996) literature, which argues that political leaders will simply not comply with the
wishes of the median voter; therefore, this model acknowledges that the identity of political
leaders aﬀects policymaking. Gender is regarded as a fundamental component of a leader's
identity. Thus, female leaders will make policies that favour women and that focus on what
is important to women.
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Essay 3: Political Reservation for Scheduled Castes
and Business Exclusion: Examining Political Quo-
tas' Eﬀects on Private Sector Entrepreneurship,1990
to 2007
In the modern Indian economy, exclusion of Scheduled Castes (SC) in the private, non-
agriculture sector is a sign of failure in addressing caste discrimination. In 1991, India initiated
several reforms to transform its national economy to an open one with a greater reliance on
market forces (Ahluwalia, 2002). As a result, private non-agricultural sectors emerged as
an engine of Indian economic growth. On the development aspects, critiques were raised by
several studies (Damodaran, 2008; Deshpande and Sharma, 2016; Iyer et al., 2013; Jodhka,
2010; Thorat and Sadana, 2009; Varshney, 2007, 2012) which stated that the beneﬁts of rapid
economic growth from reforms in 1991 had not been shared equally amongst the diﬀerent
sections of society. The SC, the lower caste social group, are especially underrepresented in
the ownership of private non-agricultural enterprises (Iyer et al., 2013).
SC politicians could lead as an agent of change in eliminating caste discrimination. The
Indian constitution guarantees political representation of SCs in three spheres of government:
central, state, and local bodies. This mandated political representation in governments is ex-
pected to bring policies in favour of their castes. Theoretical predictions are ambiguous about
the preferences of politicians from underrepresented ethnic quotas. Traditional theoretical
models (Downs, 1957; Arrow, 1951; Mayhew, 1974; Fenno and Fenno Jr, 1978; Kingdon,
1989; Cox and McCubbins, 2005) assume that politicians are likely to be vote-seeking or be
interested in holding oﬃce in future elections as well. High political competition does not
allow SC politicians to favour their castes and SC politicians are more likely to follow the
command of parties' high command. An alternate view, the citizen-candidate model (Os-
borne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley et al., 2004; Horowitz, 2001), predicts that politicians are
assumed to act in favour of their ethnic group.
Growing literature has examined the preference of Indian politicians (Lehne et al., 2018;
Jensenius, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2017). These studies focus on the preference of members
of legislative assemblies in their constituency. The empirical expectations of the literature are
that because politicians hold public oﬃce for their private return and to serve their patrons,
their actions negatively aﬀect the welfare of other castes and negatively aﬀect the eﬃcacy of
the political system as they favour towards their castes to reduce the discrimination.
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This paper contributes to the literature by posing the above expectations to the SC politi-
cians' on the private sector outcomes in their constituency. Private sector outcomes are closely
relevant to SC politicians as they can prove their political dedication by executing actions
to eradicate ongoing discrimination against SCs in the private sector or they can use the
rent-seeking sectors in the private businesses as a mode to serve patrons.
This essay answers three research questions: 1) Do SC politicians aﬀect the overall business
environment? 2) Do SC politicians favour their castes in private sector business outcomes?
and 3) Do SC politicians hold public oﬃces for the private gain?
The ﬁndings of the paper show that SC leaders preferences do not promote inclusion of
SC members in the private sector businesses nor do they aﬀect the overall business outcomes
of the other castes. However, this study ﬁnds that SC leaders are involved in patronage in
the rent-seeking sectors. The ﬁnding of the research contributes to two research domains: 1)
This study's ﬁndings support the research of(Jeﬀrey, 2002; Wilkinson, 2006; Schneider, 2014)
through evidence on clientelism and vote buying practices in India 2) This essay supports
the Traditional theoretical models (Downs, 1957; Arrow, 1951; Mayhew, 1974; Fenno and
Fenno Jr, 1978; Kingdon, 1989; Cox and McCubbins, 2005), which assume that politicians
are likely to be vote-seeking or be interested in holding oﬃce in future elections as well.
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Chapter 2
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
and Child Nutrition: Evidence from
India1
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the Indian employment guarantee program (MGNREGA - Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) on the welfare of preschool and school-going children. It has been ranked
as the world's most extensive public employment program for unskilled workers, with 278 million workers participating
in 2016. The program provides gender neutral wages and assurance for childcare at MGNREGA work sites.
This paper attempts to examine the impact of MGNREGA on the food consumption of children (both preschool
and school-going) using nationally representative data from the National Sample Surveys between 1999-2007. Using
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation stemming from the staggered roll-out of the program between 2006-07 across
districts of India, we ﬁnd that MGNREGA resulted in a decrease in the number of meals for preschool and school-going
children. The negative eﬀects on the number of meals are partially attenuated in larger households.
Key words: Women employment, children nutrition. JEL code: J20, J 23, I10
1The chapter is based on joint work with Ritam Chaurey. The paper was presented at the development economics seminar,
University of Göttingen. We thank all the participants of the seminar for their valuable comments. We thank Prof. Klasen for
providing detailed comments in shaping the paper. The usual disclaimer applies
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2.1 Introduction
Rural women in developing countries face several barriers in participating in paid employ-
ment outside the household. The most common are lack of control over assets, low skills or
education levels, gender inequality in domestic duties and stereotyping of womens' capabili-
ties (Ashraﬁ, 2009; Vigneri and Holmes, 2009; Luci et al., 2012; Hambly and Sarapura, 2009).
Developing countries have been implementing various policies in an attempt to remove these
barriers. For example, some public programs (micro-credit and training programs) support
women in fulﬁlling the requirements to participate in the labor market, while other public
work programs create employment for women without requirements (Dejardin, 1996; Khera
and Nayak, 2009; Pankaj and Tankha, 2010; Heong and Escalada, 1997; Quisumbing and
Yohannes, 2005; Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010; Kabeer, 2008; Mashiri et al., 2005).
The public work programs targeting women from low-income families do not require ed-
ucational qualiﬁcations to participate, nor are skills requested. Participants are expected
to do unskilled jobs (Del Ninno et al., 2009). However women's participation in such pro-
grams results in a reduction of their share of domestic duties (Quisumbing and Yohannes,
2005; Dejardin, 1996). Developing countries have several programs to reduce the burden of
women's domestics duties and increase their participation in the labor market. Rural women
in developing countries spend long hours ﬁnding and transporting water and gathering wood
for fuel. These duties could be alleviated by providing every household access to tap water
and subsidised cooking fuel (Panda, 2006; Dolan and Sutherland, 2002; Grown et al., 2005).
Caring for children and elders are other time-intensive domestic activities. Public ﬁnancing
of child care and daycare facilities can increase women's participation in paid employment.
For when women choose to participate in paid employment, they reduce the time spent on
domestic activities.
Women are the principle development agents for their infants and children. The devel-
opment goals related to child welfare depend on the status of women in society (UNICEF,
2006; Kabeer, 2008). Women's allocation of time increases the welfare of children via two
channels: the income from paid work, and the time spent directly in the household with
children or on other domestic activities. Women's time allocation on household activities
such as meal preparation, breastfeeding, and seeking preventive and curative medical care
is vital for infants and children's health Hoﬀman (1989). Income earned by women is bet-
ter spent on children's health and education than in households supported entirely by male
income (Blumberg, 1988; Phipps and Burton, 1998). Women's access to economic resources
increases the level of resource allocation to their children, but decreases the amount of time
14
allocated to domestic work, including childcare. The former is called income eﬀect, and the
latter is called time eﬀect (Popkin and Solon, 1976; Glick, 2002; Glick and Sahn, 1998).
In this paper, we examine the conﬂict between mothers' work and child nutrition in the
world's largest public works program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. In 2016, MGNREGA ranked as the world's largest
public employment program for unskilled workers, with 278 million workers involved. The
program's objectives are to eradicate poverty in rural India, and also to achieve empowerment
of women by reserving one-third of MGNREGA employment for women and providing them
equal wages to men. The phased rollout of the program allows us to conduct a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimation to shed light on the question. We use the number of meals consumed by
children per day as a proxy for mother's time allocated to child care, as cooking and serving
meals to children is one of the most signiﬁcant parts of domestic work. This proxy is based
on the ﬁndings of the Time Use Survey conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Program
Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India in 1998. The Summary Results of the Time
Use Survey in 1998 noted that, women reported that they spent about 2.1 hours per day
on cooking food, and about 1.1 hour on cleaning the household and utensils. Participation of
men in these activities was just nominal. Taking care of children was also mainly the women's
responsibility as they spent about 3.16 hours per week on these activities as compared to only
0.32 hours by males."
We ﬁnd that the number of meals for preschool and school aged children decreased by
2.6 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively. These declines only happen for meals consumed
at home, with no change in the number of meals consumed outside the home, or in school.
Furthermore, the number of meals goes down for children in households where mothers are
most likely to take up MGNREGA work - small and marginal landholder households, as
well as the households in the bottom 30 percentile of consumption. Furthermore, female
participation in MGNREGA is generally higher during the dry season as compared to the
rainy season. We ﬁnd that during the dry season, there is a negative impact on the number of
meals consumed by preschool and school aged children, but no eﬀect during the rainy season.
Although our main results suggest that the number of meals for children went down
after MGNREGA, it is plausible that the higher income led to an increase in the quality of
food consumed. We use a measure of food diversiﬁcation at the household level for calories,
proteins, and fats and ﬁnd that MGNREGA led to no diﬀerential eﬀect in the quality of food
at the household level. Taken together, a decline in the quantity of food and no corresponding
increase in the quality of food suggests a decline in the nutrient consumption for children.
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Finally, we look at whether the size of the household or the number of adult women in the
household compensate for the decline in the number of meals consumed by children. We ﬁnd
suggestive evidence that the number of family members and the number of adult women
partially ameliorate the negative eﬀect on quantity of meals, but only for older children.
2.2 MGNREGA Literature
The MGNREGA is the largest anti-poverty programme in the world. Owing to its importance
and scale, many studies have focused on various aspects of the programme. Past literature
has documented eﬀects on labor market outcomes, on poverty, women's empowerment, and
intra-household decisions on child health and education. The programme has been shown to
have both direct and indirect eﬀects (general equilibrium eﬀects) (Muralidharan et al., 2017).
MGNREGA has increased the wages for unskilled workers and crowded out private sector
work, (Imbert and Papp, 2015), and the largest employment beneﬁciaries of the programme
have been women and members of deprived social groups - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Klonner and Oldiges, 2014). Furthermore, the programe increased employment dur-
ing the slack season for farmers, thus, addressing the problem of seasonal unemployment
(Zimmermann, 2012). The reduction in seasonal unemployment due to the programme had
positive eﬀects on household consumption, during the lean season and the agricultural season
(Bose, 2017). The programme also improved various dimensions of poverty, as measured by
food security, ﬁnancial inclusion, and mental health (Ravi and Engler, 2015).
Apart from labor market outcomes, MGNREGA has had important eﬀects on female
empowerment. The programme has been successful in erasing wage discrimination for un-
skilled women workers. Before the programme, female workers were paid much less than the
statutory minimum wages and wages paid to their male counterparts (Azam, 2011). The
programme has also improved the bargaining power of women in the household, thereby
improving child welfare by increasing time spent in school (Afridi et al., 2012). Despite the
evidence on the positive outcomes of the programme, a number of studies have also pointed
out the diﬃculties faced by women participating in the MGNREGA programme, such as a
reduction in leisure time for working women and workplace harassment (Pankaj and Tankha,
2010). Additionally, the MGNREGA worksites were required to provide childcare facilities
in order to increase female employment. A survey of six states shows that only three percent
of MGNREGA sites had access to child care facilities, and of the three percent, most child
care centers were fake, only set up to impress the survey team (Khera and Nayak, 2009).
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Another study by Karak and Ray (2015) found that child care facilities were not functioning
suﬃciently to support women workers.
Finally, a large number of studies show evidence on the income eﬀect of the programme
on children (Afridi et al., 2012; Islam and Sivasankaran, 2014; Bose, 2017; Maity, 2015; Shah
and Steinberg, 2015). However, relatively less attention has been given to the time eﬀect
(substitution eﬀect) of the programe. Chari et al. (2019) is the ﬁrst paper examining the
eﬀect of MGNREGA on women's time allocation on child care. The study ﬁnds that women
participating in the public works programme reduced prenatal care and breastfeeding. Our
study complements this paper by focusing on the time eﬀect of the programe. We use the
number of meals eaten by children as a proxy for time allocated by the mother for child
care. We ﬁnd a reduction in the number of meals for children for women participating in
the programme. Thus, we argue that the absence of child care facilities at the MGNREGA
worksites may have aﬀected the children's welfare via the time eﬀect. Furthermore, in contrast
to Bose (2017) and Maity (2015) who evaluate the impact of MGNREGA on child nutrition
by looking at total household consumption expenditure, our paper uses a more direct measure
by focusing on the actual number of meals consumed by each child in the household.
2.2.1 MGNREGA
Workfare schemes aim to reduce poverty by providing minimum-wage work to poor, unem-
ployed adults. It is a direct anti-poverty intervention. Developed and developing countries
have implemented workfare programs, with workfare schemes designed to be suitable to the
speciﬁc context. Since 1960, India has introduced various workfare programs to support the
rural poor. In September 2005, the Indian government passed The Mahatma Gandhi Na-
tional Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). The MGNREGA programme has a
larger coverage than previous workfare programmes, and provides a statutory guarantee of
up to 100 days of annual employment at the minimum wage rate to rural households willing
to supply manual labor on local public works.
Adults willing to work for MGNREGA project works must apply for a job card at the Gram
Panchayat responsible for their residing village administration. The Gram Panchayat must
verify job card applications and issue the job card to households within 15 days of application.
The job cards are issued to applicants free of cost. The job card carries the photograph of all
the adult members of the household willing to work under MGNREGA projects. Jobs must
be assigned to the cardholders within 15 days of submitting a job application. When work is
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not assigned to the applicants, they receive unemployment compensation. MGNREGA job
applicants are hired to do unskilled works in public projects in rural area, such as water
conservation, drought prooﬁng, ﬂood protection, land development, irrigation infrastructure
and rural connectivity. All the projects must have 60:40 wage and material ratio and use of
labour-displacing machinery is prohibited.
Financing of the MGNREGA projects is supported by the central and state governments.
The central government's budget supports the entire cost of unskilled manual workers and
75 percent of the costs of material, and wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The state
governments bear the remaining 25 percent. In addition, state governments bear the cost of
unemployment allowance payable when the state government cannot provide wage employ-
ment on time.
Passed in September 2005, the MGNREGA was introduced throughout India in three
phases, introduced in February 2006, April 2007 and April 2008 respectively. In the ﬁrst
phase, MGNREGA was introduced in 200 districts, 130 districts in the second phase, and
the remaining 284 districts in the third phase.
In this paper, we will refer to these groups of districts as Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase
3, respectively. While the actual assignment mechanism to each phase is unknown, the
government stated that an explicit goal of the roll out was to target the poorest districts
ﬁrst. However, it also guaranteed that each state would receive at least one district in the
ﬁrst phase of the program. Zimmerman (2014) argues that based on the allocation of similar
programs, it is likely that states were given slots to allocate to each phase based on poverty
levels. Actual allocation was likely based on the government's own backwardness rankings,
which ranks districts based on agricultural wages, percentage of scheduled caste/scheduled
tribe in the district, and agricultural productivity (Planning Commission, 2003). However,
this ranking does not explain allocation to each phase perfectly.
18
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy
MGNREGA was rolled out in three phases across districts in India, with the ﬁrst phase
in February 2006 (200 districts), the second phase in April 2007 (130 districts), and ﬁnally
to the rest of rural India in April 2008. Since the roll-out was done in a manner where
the poorest districts received the program ﬁrst, followed by richer districts, comparing the
poorest districts in phase 1 to the richest districts from phase 3 would bias our estimates.
Therefore, we focus on comparing the outcomes for households in phase 1 districts (treated
districts) to households in phase 2 districts (control districts) before and after the ﬁrst phase
implementation of MGNREGA. These speciﬁcations are similar to Imbert and Papp (2015),
and Shah and Steinberg (2015). We run regressions of the form:
Yihdt = α + β1δdt + γd + ϕt + X
1
dt +X
2
h + εijt (2.1)
where Yihdt is the meals consumed by child i in household h in district d in year t. δdt is
an indicator variable equal to one for Phase 1 districts in the post period (2006-07) and zero
in the pre-MGNREGA period, γj and ϕt are district and year ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. X
1
dt
and X2h are district and household level control variables. We cluster standard errors at the
district level. Since we control for district ﬁxed eﬀects, we essentially compare outcomes in
Phase 1 districts relative to Phase 2 districts before and after the introduction of MGNREGA
in Phase 1 districts (2006-07).
2.3.2 Data
Our primary source of data is the nationally representative Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES) conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). CES-NSSO data
reports the details of consumption on goods and services at the household level. Our paper
includes nine rounds of CES-NSSO: rounds 55 (1999-2000), 56 (2000-01), 57 (2001-02), 58
(2002), 59 (2003), 60 (2004), 61 (2004-05), 62 (2005-06), and 63 (2006-07), between 1999 to
2007. Most surveys cover the full agricultural season from July of the previous year to June
of the next year, except for rounds 58 and 60 that cover only half a year, and round 59 covers
households from January to December. Depending on the time span of the reference period,
surveying is further divided into two to four sub-rounds each lasting three months. A survey
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with a length of half-year (a year) reference period falls into two (four) sub-rounds. Each
sub-round has an equal share in the total number of households surveyed. The CES-NSSO
rounds 55 to 63 cover every quarter between July 1999 to June 2007. Furthermore, NSSO
provides sampling weights for all individuals that we use to calculate summary statistics as
well as in our regression speciﬁcations.
Importantly for our paper, the NSSO data collects socio-demographic indicators and the
average number of meals consumed by each member of the household in the last 30 days.
The number of meals consumed by children (a proxy for mother care) is our main outcome
variable of interest. This is the only food consumption indicator available at the individual
level, whereas all the other consumption indicators are at the household level. Figure 2.1
plots that meals consumed on average by children in diﬀerent age groups across 3 years in
our data set. It is interesting to note that the number of meals consumed steadily rises for
the children between 1 and 12 years old over the years. For adolescents and adults, there is
no change in meals consumption over our sample period.
Figure 2.1: Meals intake
Source: Author's calculation using various rounds of CES-NSSO.
We use multiple control variables from CES-NSSO such as household type, social group,
religion, and gender. Household type classiﬁes rural households into ﬁve groups; agricul-
tural laborer; non-agricultural laborer; self-employed in agriculture; self-employed in non-
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agriculture; and others/not elsewhere classiﬁed. There are four social groups in the data:
scheduled tribes; scheduled castes; other backward classes; and others, who more advanced
socially and educationally. Households are also grouped according to their religious beliefs -
Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and others.
We also control for district level time-variant characteristics such as district-level night-
lights data, constructed using the method of (Henderson et al., 2012), as well as district GDP
data2.
We present descriptive statistics of the outcome variables and selected control variables for
Phase 1 districts and Phase 2 districts in the pre-program period (2004-05) in Table 2.1. The
primary outcome variable we use in the analysis is the average number of meals for children
of diﬀerent age groups. In general, children aged between 1 and 14 require more meals than
do teenagers (see Figure 2.1). We divide the children aged between 1 and 18 into three groups
based on the stages of child development: a) preschool children between 1 and 5 years old,
b) school-going children between 6 and 14 and c) teenagers between 15 to 18 years of age.
2We use district level GDP data from the Planning Commission of India.
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Table 2.1: Pre-program Summary Statistics for Phase 1 and Phase 2 Districts (2004)
Phase 1 Phase 2 p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Average Meals per day (age 1- 5) 2.824 2.828 0.929
Average Meals per day (age 6-14) 2.718 2.717 0.988
Average meals per day (age 15 -18) 2.369 2.434 0.255
Calorie diversiﬁcation index 0.363 0.343 0.244
Protein diversiﬁcation index 0.361 0.341 0.226
Fat diversiﬁcation index 0.392 0.387 0.700
Social group:
Fraction scheduled tribes (SC) 0.203 0.235 0.506
Fraction scheduled castes (ST) 0.170 0.086 0.025
Fraction other backward castes (OBC) 0.409 0.417 0.884
Fraction other castes 0.219 0.261 0.390
Household type:
Fraction agricultural labourer 0.266 0.271 0.915
Fraction non-agricultural labourer 0.090 0.087 0.924
Fraction self-employed in non-agriculture 0.159 0.165 0.893
Fraction self-employed in agriculture 0.407 0.398 0.864
Fraction other household type 0.076 0.077 0.997
Religion:
Fraction Christianity 0.014 0.018 0.772
Fraction Hinduism 0.853 0.833 0.622
Fraction Islam 0.116 0.124 0.820
Fraction other religion 0.017 0.025 0.637
Fraction boy 0.511 0.512 0.986
Fraction girl 0.489 0.488 0.986
District Light density 2.349 2.909 0.060
District GDP 4819.793 6470.618 0.078
District Observations 193 124
Individual Observations 131160 97810
Notes: This table presents means of the outcomes and control variables used in this paper. Column 1 shows
the Phase 1 districts that received MGNREGA in February 2006. Column 2 includes Phase 2 districts that
received the program after April 2007. Column 3 shows the p-values of the t-test of equality of means in
columns 1 and 2. NSS controls are constructed using NSS employment survey data conducted during the
year 2004.
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Toddlers and preschool children (1-5 years old) consume on average about 2.8 meals per
days. The meal intake for school-going children aged 6-14, and adolescents aged 15-18 are 2.7
and 2.4, respectively. This pattern also conﬁrms that younger children require more frequent
meals than older children. The means in meals consumed per day are similar between Phase
1 districts and Phase 2 districts for all groups of children in the pre-program period (Table
2.1).
The number of meals consumed per day is the only food consumption related variable
reported for each member in the household in the NSS consumer expenditure survey. Other
details relating to food consumption reported in the survey are given as totals for the entire
household. A mother participating in the labor force decides to allocate time between market
work and domestic chores, including preparing meals for children. Although, a mother taking
part in a workfare program has less time available for domestic duties than a non-working
mother, but an increase in the purchasing power for the working mother may lead her (or
the household) to purchase a variety of food items for the children and the family. To test
for this hypothesis, we constructed a food diversiﬁcation index at the household level. We
use a Herﬁndahl index to look at the diversity of the consumption bundle for various macro-
nutrients at the household level: calories, proteins, and fat. The index values lie between 0
and 1. A value close to one in the diversiﬁcation index indicates that the family depends on a
few food items to meet their macro-nutrients needs. The mean values of food diversiﬁcation
indices are comparable between Phase 1 and Phase 2 districts in the pre-program period.
Means of selected macroeconomic indicators as of 2004-05, district GDP and district
night light density, are statistically diﬀerent between Phase 1 and Phase 2 districts. This is
consistent with phase 2 districts being slightly richer in the pre-program period.
Although the means of our outcome of interest (meals consumed by children) are similar
in the pre-program period, we need to check whether they were trending similarly in Phase
1 and Phase 2 districts before the introduction of MGNREGA. We check for pre-program
parallel trends and present our results in the next section.
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2.4 Results
By law, at least a third of MGNREGA beneﬁciaries must be women. Women's enrollment
in MGNREGA related public works in turn may reduce their time allocation for housework
and childcare related activities. We test for this hypothesis with our main outcome of inter-
est  the meals intake of children in various age groups in response to the phased roll out
of MGNREGA. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁ-
cation, essentially comparing the outcome of interest (meals intake of children), in districts
where MGNREGA was rolled out in the ﬁrst phase compared to districts where MGNREGA
was rolled out in the second phase. In all the regression speciﬁcations, we control for district
ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, household-level controls such as household size, age, type
of workers in the household, gender, caste, and religion, and district-level controls such as
district GDP, and district-level night time luminosity. We cluster the standard errors at the
district level. Hence, our regressions look at within district changes in outcomes for children
over time between phase 1 and phase 2 districts before and after the ﬁrst phase of MGN-
REGA was introduced.
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Table 2.2: Testing for parallel trends
(1) (2) (3)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA X 2001 -0.00650 -0.0250 -0.0318
(0.0524) (0.0539) (0.0581)
MGNREGA X 2002 -0.0404 -0.0257 -0.0327
(0.0414) (0.0401) (0.0502)
MGNREGA X 2003 0.0137 -0.0155 -0.0375
(0.0412) (0.0351) (0.0424)
MGNREGA X 2004 -0.0403 0.000365 0.0102
(0.0397) (0.0364) (0.0434)
MGNREGA X 2005 -0.0422 -0.0353 -0.0451
(0.0398) (0.0402) (0.0457)
MGNREGA X 2006 -0.0790* -0.0863** -0.0281
(0.0440) (0.0433) (0.0557)
MGNREGA X 2007 -0.163*** -0.139** -0.153*
(0.0491) (0.0604) (0.0787)
Observations 70,863 129,252 49,095
R-squared 0.210 0.213 0.351
District FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of meals consumed by children in diﬀerent age groups. The
coeﬃcients on MGNREGA X year (year = 2001-2007) indicate the diﬀerence in the number of meals
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 districts across the years 2001-2007. Standard errors clustered at the district
level. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Before presenting our baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results, it is important to check
whether the parallel trends assumption are satisﬁed. In Table 2.2, we check whether the
intake of meals by children in diﬀerent age groups in phase 1 districts is diﬀerent than
those in phase 2 districts for each year between 2001 and 2007. We ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the intake of meals for children in the age group of 15 in phase 1
districts compared to phase 2 districts before the introduction of MGNREGA (until 2006).
However, there is a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of meals consumed by
children between 15, after the introduction of MGNREGA in 2006 and 2007 in phase 1
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districts relative to phase 2 districts. This relationship is mirrored by the number of meals
for children between 614 years of age, as well as for older teenagers (1518 years old).
Table 2.2 therefore, statistically conﬁrms that there were no diﬀerential trends in the number
of meals for children in diﬀerent age groups in phase 1 and phase 2 districts before the
introduction of MGNREGA, and the diﬀerences only manifest after 2006. Figure 2.2 is the
corresponding visual representation to Table 2.2. This provides credence to our baseline
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression speciﬁcations.
Figure 2.2: Estimated coeﬃcient plots for number of meals for diﬀerent age groups
Source: Author's calculation using various rounds of CES-NSSO.
Table 2.3: MGNREGA impact on the meals intake of rural children
(1) (2) (3)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA -0.0729*** -0.0803*** -0.0325
(0.0277) (0.0299) (0.0373)
Observations 70,863 129,252 49,095
R-squared 0.209 0.213 0.350
District FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes
Notes: *** p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
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The results from our baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation are presented in Table
2.3. We interpret the coeﬃcient on MGNREGA as the diﬀerence in the number of meals for
children in a particular age group in phase 1 districts compared to phase 2 districts, after the
introduction of MGNREGA relative to before the program. In column 1, we ﬁnd that the
number of meals consumed by preschool children (ages 15) relatively decreased by 0.073 in
phase 1 districts. This corresponds to a 2.6% decline in the number of meals consumed by
preschool children in phase 1 districts after MGNREGA came in to eﬀect. In column 2, we
ﬁnd that the number of meals for school going children (ages 6-14) in phase 1 decreased by
0.08 after MGNREGA as compared to school going children in phase 2 districts, relative to
these diﬀerences before MGNREGA. This translates in to a 2.8% decline in the number of
meals for school-going children in phase 1 districts. Finally in column 3, we do not ﬁnd any
statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of meals for children between the ages of 15
through 18. Taken together, these results suggest that there was a decline in the number of
meals consumed by preschool and school-going children in phase 1 districts relative to phase
2 districts, after the introduction of MGNREGA compared to before MGNREGA. However,
there is no eﬀect of MGNREGA on the number of meals consumed by older children in phase
1 and phase 2 districts. This is consistent with MGNREGA aﬀecting the time allocation of
women on childcare activities, as a result of which the number of meals consumed by youger
children declined.
In India, meals can be consumed at home, outside the home (for example, at a neighbor's
or relative's home), or at school (for example, through the midday meal scheme3). Since
our hypothesis is that MGNREGA impacted the time allocation of women in household and
childcare activities, the program should only have aﬀected the number of meals for children
at home, and not meals outside, nor in schools. In Table 2.4, we look at the diﬀerential eﬀects
of MGNREGA, on these three margins, meals at home, meals outside the home, and meals at
school. We ﬁnd results supporting our main hypothesis. In columns 1 through 2, we ﬁnd that
the number of meals at home for children in age groups 15 and 614 declines by 0.083 and
0.089 respectively. For older children (1518), there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence as
a result of MGNREGA. Importantly, we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the number of meals outside the home, or at schools for children in any age group. These
results also suggest that after MGNREGA, the time allocation for housework and childcare
activities as measured by the number of meals for children signiﬁcantly fell.
3The midday meal scheme provides free lunches for school aged children on working days in government schools. There is
widespread evidence that the midday meal scheme acted as a safety net for children (?).
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Table 2.5: Households' landholding size: Impact on children of diﬀerent age groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18] [1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA -0.0707** -0.0919*** -0.0409 -0.0482 0.0173 -0.0132
(0.0300) (0.0314) (0.0399) (0.0485) (0.0576) (0.0537)
Observations 56,981 104,753 38,696 13,637 24,074 10,250
R-squared 0.217 0.217 0.355 0.226 0.271 0.423
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Small and Marginal Landholders Large Landholders
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
In Table 2.5, we divide the sample by landholding size. Small and marginal landholders
in our sample own up to 2 hectares of land, whereas large landholders own greater than 2
hectares. MGNREGA should have a diﬀerential impact on small and marginal landholders,
as households in this group are more likely to seek employment through the program as
compared to large landholders. Columns 13 restrict the sample to small and marginal land-
holders, whereas columns 46 restrict the sample to large landholders. In column 1 and 2, we
ﬁnd that after MGNREGA, there was a relative decline in the number of meals consumed by
children of small and marginal landholding families in age groups 15 and 614 by 0.07 and
0.09 respectively, in phase 1 compared to phase 2 districts. There was however no decline in
the number of meals for older teens (1518 years) in these families (column 3). Reassuringly,
we ﬁnd no diﬀerential eﬀects in the number of meals consumed by children in large land-
holding households in columns 46. In the same spirit, we also split our sample by household
consumption percentiles in Table 2.6, where we hypothesize that MGNREGA should diﬀer-
entially aﬀect households in the bottom 30 percentile of consumption. In Table 2.6, columns
1 through 3, we look at the impact of MGNREGA on meals consumed by children in dif-
ferent age groups in households in the bottom 30% of consumption. In columns 4 through
6, we look at the outcome for households in the middle consumption percentiles (30-60%)
of consumption, and ﬁnally in columns 7 through 9 on households in the top consumption
percentiles (60-90%) of consumption. Similar to the results in Table 2.5, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
decline in the number of meals consumed by preschool (column 1) and school-going children
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(column 2) in phase 1 districts compared to phase 2 districts as a result of MGNREGA. We
do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between children in the age group of 15
through 18 between phase 1 and phase 2 districts due to MGNREGA. In columns 3 through
9, we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of meals consumed by
children of diﬀerent age groups in households in the middle group (30-60%) or the top group
(60-90%) of consumption. This strengthens our main results that MGNREGA resulted in a
reduction in the number of meals consumed for ages 1 through 14, especially in households
that were mostly likely to be aﬀected by the program, i.e. the bottom 30% of households.
These results also conﬁrm our main hypothesis.
Table 2.7: Impact on households during dry and rainy season
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18] [1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA -0.0728** -0.124*** -0.0481 -0.0507 -0.0067 -0.0248
(0.0339) (0.0351) (0.0471) (0.0389) (0.0435) (0.0516)
Observations 37,327 67,339 25,402 33,536 61,913 23,693
R-squared 0.250 0.253 0.397 0.220 0.216 0.356
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Dry season Rainy season
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
Next, in Table 2.7, we look at the impact of MGNREGA on children across phase 1 and
phase 2 districts in dry and rainy seasons of the year separately. This follows from Imbert
and Papp (2015) who ﬁnd that take-up of public work employment was higher during the dry
season than during the rainy season. Thus, we expect to ﬁnd a larger impact of MGNREGA
on meals consumed by children during the dry season than during the rainy season. In
columns 1 through 3, we focus on children in diﬀerent age groups in the dry season (January
to June). In columns 4 through 6, we focus on children in diﬀerent age groups in the rainy
season (July to December). We ﬁnd that during the dry season (columns 1 through 3), there
is a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the number of meals consumed by children, whereas
during the rainy season, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Taken together, these
results strengthen our conclusion that MGNREGA signiﬁcantly reduced the time allocated
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for household work including taking care of children.
Table 2.8: Impact on quality of food (food diversiﬁcation) of households
(1) (2) (3)
Calorie Protein Fat
MGNREGA -0.00673 -0.00459 0.00659
(0.00801) (0.00811) (0.00522)
Observations 116,073 116,073 116,073
R-squared 0.359 0.299 0.263
District FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
Having focused thus far on the number of meals, next we look at the quality of food
(food diversiﬁcation) in Table 2.8. Since the quantity of meals declined post-MGNREGA,
one could imagine a situation that the higher income from MGNREGA may have resulted
in an increase in the quality of food (income eﬀect). We use a measure food diversiﬁcation at
the household level for calories, proteins, and fats to proxy for the quality (nutritious value)
of food. We convert the household's food items consumption to macronutrients using the
conversion factors reported in NSSO thick surveys4. In Table 2.8, we ﬁnd no evidence for an
improvement in the quality of food intake at the household level.
4NSSO follows the conversion factor of C. Gopalan, B.V. Ramasastry and S.C. Balasubramanian, revised and updated by
B.S. Narasinga, Y.G. Deosthale and K.C. Pant (Gopalan et al., 1991, 2000; Narasingha Rao et al., 1989).
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Table 2.9: Impact on the meals intake of rural children: household size and women in the family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18] [1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA -0.110* -0.160*** -0.142* -0.0793* -0.121** -0.109*
(0.0574) (0.0517) (0.0798) (0.0469) (0.0486) (0.0632)
MGNREGA X HHsize 0.00556 0.0121* 0.0178*
(0.00734) (0.00641) (0.0104)
MGNREGA X No. of women 0.00440 0.0281 0.0529*
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0296)
Observations 70,863 129,252 49,095 70,863 129,252 49,095
R-squared 0.210 0.213 0.350 0.210 0.213 0.350
District FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
In India, rural households often live in a joint family setting with many adult household
members. Since MGNREGA guarantees one hundred days of employment per household, at
any point in time, a larger household would have some members who are not involved in
MGNREGA work. For example, Shah and Steinberg (2015) ﬁnd that adolescent girls are
more likely to substitute for their mothers in domestic work in response to MGNREGA.
Thus, in a larger household, there would be some members available to pick up the slack in
household and childcare related activities. We test for this hypothesis next. In Table 2.9, we
test whether the household size or the number of adult females in the household ameliorates
the negative eﬀect of MGNREGA on meals consumed by children in diﬀerent age groups.
In columns 13, we look at whether the household size has a compensating eﬀect on the
number of meals consumed by children in age groups 15, 614, and 1518. Essentially, we
are concerned with the coeﬃcient on MGNREGA X HHSize. We ﬁnd that the household
size partially compensates for the number of meals consumed by older children (ages 614
and 1518), but has no eﬀect on the number of meals of young children (ages 15). In columns
46, we look at the compensating eﬀect of the number of adult women in the household - the
coeﬃcient on MGNREGA X No. of women. We ﬁnd that the number of adult women only
compensates for the number of meals consumed by older children (age group 1518), but has
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no eﬀect on meals for children in other age groups. Taken together, our results suggest that
the household size or the number of adult women in the household only partially attenuates
the negative eﬀect of MGNREGA on the number of meals consumed. Furthermore, this
compensating eﬀect only happens for older children, with no eﬀect on the younger kids (age
group 15).
Table 2.10: Impact on children from urban households
(1) (2) (3)
Number of meals
[1-5] [6-14] [15-18]
MGNREGA -0.0341 0.00701 -0.0420
(0.0407) (0.0336) (0.0340)
Observations 28,636 59,332 27,639
R-squared 0.318 0.299 0.402
District FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes
District controls yes yes yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p <0.1
Standard errors clustered at the district level.
Finally, in Table 2.10, we carry out a falsiﬁcation test. Since MGNREGA was introduced
in the rural parts of the districts it should not have aﬀected the urban households. We check
whether MGNREGA aﬀected the number of meals of children amongst the urban households.
We ﬁnd no diﬀerential eﬀect on the number of meals consumed by children in the diﬀerent
age groups in urban areas. This validates our ﬁndings of the eﬀects of MGNREGA on child
meal intake.
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2.5 Conclusions
Women play a central role in their child's health and education. As women enter the work
force their time allocated to household and child care activities will invariably go down.
Although child welfare may go up due to the mother's income from paid work, previous work
has shown that Indian women are doing unskilled jobs during periods of adverse economic
shocks, rather than because of good economic opportunities (Klasen and Pieters, 2012). In
this paper, we examine the conﬂict between mother's work and child nutrition in the world's
largest public works program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act MGNREGA in India. Using the phase-wise roll out of the program across districts and
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design, we ﬁnd that female participation in MGNREGA reduces
the number of meals consumed by preschool and school-going children. The negative eﬀects
are partially attenuated by more members at home, albeit only for older children. However,
adequate public investment in childcare services at the work site may alleviate the potential
negative eﬀects of the trade-oﬀ between mother's work and child nutrition. Future work
needs to focus on the eﬀects of female friendly workplace investments and their eﬀects on
household and child welfare, especially with increasing employment opportunities for women
in developing countries (Gaddis and Klasen, 2011).
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Chapter 3
Women's political representation and
educational attainments: A district-level
analysis in India1
Abstract
This paper has two major objectives: (1) to analyze whether the gender of politicians in India is relevant to the
educational achievements of the residents of the districts in which they were elected; (2) to test whether politicians are
more sensitive to the needs of people of the same gender. By applying econometric techniques to a dataset obtained by
merging individual with district-level political data, we concluded that an increase by 10 percentage points in women's
political representation produces an increase by 6 percentage points in the probability of children completing primary
school. We then found gender-diﬀerentiated results: women's political representation aﬀects signiﬁcantly more girls'
than boys' education. Finally, the paper provides further evidence of the beneﬁts of women's political representation
and argues that, in order to increase the latter, an integrated approach, going beyond isolated gender quotas, is
required.
Key words: Women political representation, children schooling. JEL code: I20, I24, I38
1The chapter is based on joint work with Francesco Burchi. We would like to thank the German Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for funding this study as part of the research project on the political economy
of inclusive growth. We also would like to express our gratitude to Markus Loewe, Tilman Altenburg, Luis Camacho, Imme
Scholz, and Giorgio D'Agostino for commenting on various versions of the paper.
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3.1 Introduction
During the past two decades, a growing body of literature has investigated the eﬀects of
women's political representation on a range of economic, political and social indicators. These
studies have focused on high-income countries, as well as middle-income and low-income
countries (Powley, 2007; Panday, 2008). The empirical evidence has been drawn mostly
from countries that have set more or less explicit gender quotas in national or sub-national
assemblies or administrations.
In the literature on political economy, the `citizen-candidate model' views the identity of
politicians as being one of the fundamental determinants of investment choices (Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996). Building on these models, scholars have investigated the speciﬁc role played
by politicians' gender in policy-making (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004b; Bardhan et al.,
2010a). Men and women are assumed to have diﬀerent preferences, and this is taken as being
why they make diﬀerent choices once they obtain important political tasks. While most of
the empirical studies based on these assumptions do not clearly deﬁne the nature of these
diﬀerences.
This paper looks at the relationship between female political representation and educa-
tional achievements in India. One important reason for focusing on this country is the fact
that the Indian parliament is currently debating the possibility of reserving a proportion of
seats in state assemblies for women. While most of the existing literature focuses on the low-
est administrative level, i.e. the Gram panchayat2, or on the states, our analysis looks at the
relationship in state assembly constituencies. State assembly constituency politics has not
been examined in great detail thus far. Given the lack of data on educational outcomes, we
cannot fully run a constituency-level analysis, but need to aggregate information at district
level.
In detail, this paper tries to answer three questions. The ﬁrst one is: Does women's political
representation have a positive eﬀect on primary education completion rates? Our aim is to
test whether women pay more attention to education and try to divert more resources to this
sector. If so, this should be reﬂected by higher school completion rates. This topic has been
little explored to date: to the best of our knowledge, only one paper Clots-Figueras (2012)
has studied this relationship in India. (Clots-Figueras, 2012) studies the period between 1970
and 1992. In the late 1990s, many other state governments allocated discretionary funds to
2The Gram Panchayat is a local self-government at the village or small town level in India. This is the lowest tier of Panchayat
Raj Institutions, a complex multi-level governance system with responsibilities of civic administration and independent, though
limited, power of taxation.
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MLAs, known as the MLA Local Area Development Scheme Fund (MLALADS). This fund
has given space to politicians to execute preferred polices at their constituency.
The two other research questions are: a) Does women's political representation aﬀect
girls' more than boys' probability to attain primary education? This way, we verify whether
female politicians pay more attention to the education of girls; b) What are the possible
channels through which women's political representation aﬀects educational achievements?
Given data constraints, we investigated only a few possible channels, such as the availability
of schools  already examined, for example, by (Clots-Figueras, 2012)  and the coverage of
the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) scheme, never explored in the literature. The MDM scheme is a
very large school feeding program that has boosted primary school attendance (Afridi, 2011;
Drèze and Goyal, 2003), especially among girls. The main hypothesis is that female politicians
pay more attention than male politicians to this welfare program, thus improving educational
attainment through this particular channel. However, in case of positive pro-female eﬀects,
a possibility is the existence of a role model eﬀect: girls' educational aspirations and, as
a consequence, educational outcomes can increase as a result of seeing women undertaking
important tasks in society. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test this hypothesis empirically.
In order to answer these three questions we constructed a complex database. Following
the previous work of Clots-Figueras (2012), we combined individual data from a nation-
ally representative survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Oﬃce (NSSO) with
constituency-level information from the Election Commission of India, which was aggregated
at district level. As for this district-level dataset, we extended Clots-Figueras' database: while
she uses data for the 1970-1992 period, our information covers the 1970-2003 period. The
household-level data come from the 68th NSSO survey (2011-2012), while Clots-Figueras
(2012) used the 55th NSSO survey (1999-2000).
In order to overcome a major `omitted variables' bias, due to the fact that more pro-
gressive districts are more likely to have more women in political bodies and to invest more
in education, our econometric strategy is based on an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Thus, the proportion of district seats won by women was instrumented by the share of district
constituencies won by women in close male-female contests, i.e. in elections in which there
was a narrow gap between the winner and the runner-up.
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The paper is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 presents evidence of the relationship
between women's political representation and development in India. Section 3.3 concentrates
on the political economy of education and illustrates the conceptual framework. The data
and variables are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 sets out the results of the quantitative
analyses. Finally, the concluding remarks and policy recommendations are presented in
Section 3.6.
3.2 Women's Representation in Politics, Policy-making and Development Out-
comes
This Section reviews the evidence of the multiple eﬀects of female political roles both as
members of executive bodies and as members of legislative assemblies  at diﬀerent levels in
India, i.e. state, district and local. Most studies concentrate on the lowest administrative level,
the Gram panchayat (GP), because the 73rd Amendment of the Indian Constitution (1992)
stipulates that one third of the seats in local councils and one third of local leaders' posts
(known as pradhan or sarpanch, depending on the state) in rural areas must be reserved
for women. The decision on which gram panchayat (GP) is to be reserved for women is
`random', i.e. independent of any village-speciﬁc characteristics. In particular, this means
that women are also elected in villages with a female-hostile electorate. This allows a straight
comparison to be made in terms of development inputs and outcomes between `reserved' and
`unreserved' villages, allowing the diﬀerences to be attributed to the political leader's gender.
For this reason, many scholars have exploited this unique research design.
The studies fall into two groups: (1) those looking at the inﬂuence of women's political
representation on `input' indicators, i.e. investment choices, use of budgets and management
of welfare programs; (2) those analyzing the impact of women's political representation on
multiple development `outcomes' (Burchi and De Muro, 2016).
3.2.1 Women's political representation and policy-making
Provision of public goods
In a highly inﬂuential study in West Bengal and Rajasthan, Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo
(2004b) concluded that `there are signiﬁcantly more investments in drinking water in GPs
reserved for women'. Moreover, reserved villages were found to invest less in public goods
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more of interest for men, e.g. roads in Rajasthan. Controlling for several characteristics of
the pradhan, Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004b) conﬁrm that it is its gender that explains the
diﬀerences in terms of the provision of public goods. In line with Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo
(2004b) and Beaman et al. (2010) found that female leaders invested more in drinking water
facilities and that the overall quantity of public goods was signiﬁcantly higher in reserved
villages, while the quality of public goods was higher, though not statistically signiﬁcantly,
in reserved villages. A study in the state of Karnataka produced opposite results: the quality
of rural services appeared to be better in male-led villages (Raabe et al., 2009).
Deininger et al. (2015) ) used survey data for 233 villages, to test whether there was a
diﬀerence between reserved and unreserved villages in terms of the quality of public goods
delivered, as measured by self-reported data. Their ﬁndings diﬀered somewhat from those
of other scholars, as they reported reservation as having an adverse eﬀect on the quality of
public goods. However, an in-depth analysis, which accounted for other characteristics of the
leader, showed that the main factor is the leader's lack of experience (rather than its gender).
Using state panel data for 1967-2001, Clots-Figueras (2011) focused on women's repre-
sentation in state assemblies, educational public goods and health-related public goods. Her
empirical study showed that female political representation is positively associated with the
number of schools (particularly primary schools) and with several health inputs.
Expenditures
The gender of political leaders and legislators does not appear to have any relevant eﬀect on
the use made of budgets. The study by Raabe et al. (2009) in Karnataka showed there was
no substantial diﬀerence in the use made of GPs' own resources: health and education are
priorities in both reserved and unreserved villages. Similar results were obtained by Rajara-
man and Gupta (2012) in four Indian states. Their study suggested that the gender of the
sarpanch does not aﬀect the likelihood of funds being spent on water, traditionally a more
female-sensitive sector. In line with the above papers, Clots-Figueras (2012) showed that the
proportion of female politicians in state assemblies does not aﬀect budget allocation, either
at aggregate level or in sectors such as health and education.
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Corruption
A study by Bardhan et al. (2005) found contradictory evidence of the impact of political
reservation on the targeting of anti-poverty interventions: depending on the speciﬁc inter-
vention, targeting was better, worse or not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in reserved villages compared
to non-reserved ones. Using data from the same Indian villages, but based on survey data
rather than administrative data, Bardhan et al. (2010b) still did not ﬁnd any evidence of
better targeting in reserved villages. In a comprehensive study in Andhra Pradesh, Afridi
et al. (2013) initially found that the presence of female pradhans increased corruption in
the management of the National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme. When the leader's
other characteristics were factored into econometric models, however, it became clear that the
problem is female leaders' lack of experience rather than their gender. By contrast, Beaman
et al. (2010) found that fewer bribes were paid in reserved councils.
3.2.2 Development outputs and outcomes
Health
Dongre (2010) identiﬁed a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between women's
reservation and the prevalence of diarrhea in Andhra Pradesh. There is also some evidence of
a positive eﬀect of women's political representation on many health-seeking behaviours and
health conditions (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014).
Education
To the best of our knowledge, not one paper has looked at the eﬀects of female reservation
in Indian GPs  whether as local leaders or as council members  on educational outcome
indicators, such as school completion rates or children's learning abilities. Only a study by
Binswanger-Mkhize et al. (2012) examined the impact of women's reservation on access to
primary education, ﬁnding a positive relationship.
Clots-Figueras (2012), on the other hand, investigated whether the educational level of
district residents is a function of women's political representation immediately before they
enrolled at primary school. She found empirical evidence of a strong, positive relationship in
urban areas, but not signiﬁcant in rural areas. The author's interpretation was that women
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assigned greater value to education in urban areas because of the higher expected returns.
Participation in political life and women's empowerment
Several studies have investigated whether female reservation enhances women's ability to take
part in political life, broadly speaking. Most papers found empirical evidence that female
leaders had a positive eﬀect on attendance of village meetings, with special reference to
women (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004b; Beaman et al., 2010), and even on active political
participation (Deininger et al., 2015). By contrast, Raabe et al. (2009) found male attendance
to be slightly higher in reserved GPs, while female attendance was very low in both types
of village. Finally, some studies conducted in southern states concluded that reservation did
not aﬀect the likelihood of village meetings being held or the probability of people attending
them (Besley et al., 2005; Ban and Rao, 2008).
3.3 The Political Economy of Education
Most of the above papers also sought to test the validity of two alternative political economy
models, namely the Downsian model (Downs, 1957) and the citizen-candidate model. The
ﬁrst type of model assumes that, once elected, leaders commit to the policies that favour the
median voter. In other words, the identity of the political leader is assumed not to play a role.
By contrast, the citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski,
1996) assume that political leaders will not simply comply with the wishes of the median
voter: therefore, these models acknowledge that the identity of political leaders aﬀects policy-
making. Gender is regarded as a fundamental component of a leader's identity: thus, female
leaders will make policies that favour women and what women care about.
The present paper joins the literature on the eﬀects of women's political representation,
placing the emphasis on basic education. Education enhances employability and income and
is a key driver of health, nutrition and participation in public life (Sen, 1999). Moreover, the
educational system in India has several problems. While overall educational performance is
gradually improving and does not collocate India in the lowest group, there are high levels
of inequality across people, between men and women, and between social groups (Crespo-
Cuaresma et al., 2013). Current studies on India do not provide robust evidence of the role
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played by women's political representation in the educational sector. One study in Rajasthan,
for example, shows that in villages headed by women politicians the village meetings do not
dedicate more attention to education (Bonu et al., 2011). Higher female political representa-
tion seems to correlate positively with input indicators related to the quality of educational
services.
However, none of the studies on India has actually examined whether women's representa-
tion in turn aﬀects educational outcomes such as school completion rates or learning abilities.
The only exceptions are the studies by Clots-Figueras (2012) and by Beaman et al. (2012),
which point, respectively, to a signiﬁcant relationship only in urban areas and only for girls.
Many previous studies tried to exploit the randomization of the reservation of GP seats for
women to identify diﬀerences in policy-making and outcomes. However, there are two main
limitations in the studies focusing on this administrative level: (a) in practice, some states
allocate very limited funds and responsibilities to panchayats (Planning Commission, 2011);
(b) reservation creates a strong selection bias as women leaders have less political experience
and lower education: only a small number of papers published to date use reliable data that
take account of these factors.
This paper, instead, focuses on the state assembly constituencies, which are the level just
below the district. In the states assembly elections, there is no reservation policy for women.
The elected representative of the state assembly constituency is called member of legislative
assembly (MLA). MLAs have a legislative role in the state assembly, but are also the sec-
ond most powerful politician in the assembly constituency after the member of parliament
(MP). The study by (Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015) ﬁnd that MLA's time allocation
in legislative activities has declined. In contrast, their activities at the level of constituency
have signiﬁcantly increased. MLAs play an active role addressing their constituency related
matters by making requests to bureaucrats or cabinet ministers on behalf of the constituency
(Asher and Novosad, 2017). Overall, they have a signiﬁcant degree of control over federally-
appointed bureaucrats (Iyer et al., 2013). Given that the provision of several public services in
India is administrated at district level (Betancourt and Gleason, 2000), MLAs often write to
senior district oﬃcials in order to improve the quality of these services in their constituency.
For example, education, which is predominantly under the responsibility of the State govern-
ments, is monitored and administrated at district level through the district education oﬃce.
Therefore, MLAs' political power plays a vital role in improving the educational outcomes of
people living in their constituency. For this study, however, we cannot fully run our analysis
at constituency level because we do not have individual data on educational variables for this
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administrative level (see Section 3.4). We rely on information aggregated at district level. In
particular, the information on election results is taken from the constituencies information
and then aggregated for the district.
In our work, we analyze the eﬀect of women's political representation on the probability
of children completing primary education. We also investigate whether this eﬀect is gender-
diﬀerentiated. In case of a positive, gender-neutral eﬀect, we then verify possible channels
that mediate this relationship. Due to several data constraints, we could explore only two
main channels, i.e. the presence of school buildings and the coverage of the Mid-Day Meal
Scheme (MDM). The latter is the world's largest school meals program and has a twofold
objective: raising school attendance and improving the nutrition of primary school children.
A series of studies has already demonstrated that this program has a positive eﬀect on school
attendance and completion (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Singh et al., 2013). However, there is
high heterogeneity in the management and implementation of this scheme throughout India.
Several challenges were encountered in implementing the MDM in the schools, such as poor
nutritional contents of the meal, contaminated food, and the lack of proper kitchens, store
rooms and access to clean water supply in the school, which negatively aﬀected the quality
of the meals provided (Sahai, 2014). On behalf of their constituency, MLAs have the political
power to ensure a better functioning of welfare programs, such as the MDM.
We consider politicians' gender to be an important aspect, together with other identity-
related factors such as membership of a caste, religious group or party. Our hypothesis is
that women attach a higher value to education (and primary education in particular) than
men do. In consequence, districts with more female MLAs will tend to invest more in this
sector and pay more attention to programs like the MDM.
Unlike other scholars, we do not regard women as a homogenous interest group that seeks
to maximise its utility, i.e. to improve female-sensitive sectors such as education. We do not
argue that education is universally more important for women than for men, as this would
imply that the nature of the gender diﬀerence is `biological' or `due to nature'. If the gender of
a political leader matters for policy-making, this is due to the `social' positioning of women.
Women in India lead very diﬀerent lives from men. As the main carers of children, they
know better and care more about children's well-being (including their education). Empirical
studies in India, based on both quantitative and qualitative information, support the idea
that female politicians care more about education than male politicians (Singh and Pundir,
2002; Jayal, 2006; Raabe et al., 2009)3. As the nature of these diﬀerences is not biological,
3In an extensive survey conducted by the World Bank, the Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA), the Indian
42
this assumption might easily not work in a diﬀerent context than India, where culture, family
structures, and social norms are diﬀerent.
Finally, factors other than a commitment to and investment in education may aﬀect the
intensity and even the direction of the relationship between women's political representation
and education. Good examples would be women's capacity to implement adequate educa-
tional policies and their eﬀective ability to express themselves in a district's political environ-
ment dominated by men. The former is a serious problem in many GPs, as reservation has
often brought inexperienced women to power in female-reserved villages. In our case, women
run in fully competitive state elections, so there is no reason to expect a substantial gender
diﬀerence in terms of the ability to implement educational.
In case of a positive eﬀect of women's political representation on school completion only
among girls, there are three main possible explanations. The ﬁrst is that, again for social
reasons, female politicians really make the interests of other women/girls: as they are often
marginalized themselves, they might care more about education as a tool for emancipation
for the vulnerable groups, such as other women, girls and members of underprivileged castes.
It is, however, diﬃcult to test it. In general, an improvement of the management of the MDM
could be a mediating channel since the studies of Afridi (2011) and Singh and Gupta (2015)
show that this welfare program has a signiﬁcantly larger impact on girls' education. We also
disaggregate the information on the coverage of MDM by gender to verify whether there is a
pro-female bias in the coverage of the program in districts characterized by more women in
politics.
A second explanation is the presence of role model eﬀects: female politicians may not
diﬀer from male politicians with regard to the policy-making, but the simple fact that girls
see women in important political positions may increase their ambitions and push them to
stay longer in school. The presence of this role model eﬀects has been already found in other
studies in India (Beaman et al., 2012). In order to verify this hypothesis, we would need, for
example, data on girls' educational aspirations, which unfortunately are missing.
Ministry of Rural Development and the German Development Institute (DIE) in 9 Indian states it emerges that in villages
where the local leaders are women, education appears signiﬁcantly higher in the ranking of village priorities. The probability
that education is considered important or extremely important is signiﬁcantly higher in villages reserved for women (100%) as
compared to non-reserved villages (82.5%).
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3.4 Data and Methods
3.4.1 Dataset
This paper combines data from two main sources. The ﬁrst is the, 2011-2012 National Sam-
ple Survey Oﬃce (NSSO) Survey on Employment and Unemployment conducted by the
Indian Ministry of Statistics. This nationally representative household survey contains socio-
demographic information, including a section on education. We restricted our sample to
individuals aged 14 or older, assuming that it would be `normal' to have completed primary
school by that age. Children are supposed to start primary school at the age of six. Depending
on the state, primary education lasts for either four or ﬁve years. Accounting for some late
starts and resits (lasting 1 or 2 years), we decided to set the threshold at the age of 14.
The second source is the database of political variables provided by Clots-Figueras (2012).4
The author collected extensive information on election results in each constituency, from the
statistical reports published by the Election Commissions of India for the 16 biggest states.
Elections are held regularly in each constituency, resulting in one of the candidates winning
the corresponding seat in the state assembly. These data were aggregated to create district-
level indicators, such as the proportion of district seats won by women. Since Clots-Figueras'
database only covers the 1967-2001 period, we extended it to the years 2002 and 2003, years
in which 6 states held elections.
We then merged the datasets using two identiﬁers, i.e. the district code5 and the year
in which the individual started primary education, i.e. when he or she was six years old.
Our unit of analysis is therefore the individual. His or her characteristics are linked to the
political information for the district in which he/she lived at the age of six6. In this way, we
can see whether district-level political factors inﬂuence (with some lags) the likelihood that
children who have supposedly just started ﬁrst grade will go on to complete their primary
education. Given this procedure for merging the two datasets and since the women's political
representation variables are constructed as a three-year average (Section 3.4.2), our ﬁnal
4The database is available at: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.4.1.212.
5Creating district codes was very time-consuming as the district boundaries changed over time: only between 2001 and 2011
34 districts of our sample changed boundaries. While it was possible to follow the districts that split or changed name during
this period, information on those districts that were created later combining parts of existing districts was lost. This is why the
number of districts used in the main estimates of this paper is slightly lower than those used by Clots-Figueras (2012)) (219 vs.
233)
6While Clots-Figueras used the 1999-2000 NSSO dataset, which includes information on rural-urban migration, the 2011-
2012 NSSO survey does not contain such information. Therefore, we were unable to restrict the sample to people who did not
migrate to a diﬀerent district. However, the evidence points to a limited migration between districts in the period under review
(Topalova, 2010; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009). Other studies make the same assumption (Edmonds et al., 2010)
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dataset covers the period 1970-2003, while Clots-Figueras' main analysis is based on data only
for the period 1970-1992. Focusing on these additional 11 years is very important because
since 1993 many state governments introduced the Discretionary Constituency Fund to
incentivize the legislator to engage more in district speciﬁc issues.
Finally, in order to explore potential channels through which the relationship between
women's political representation and educational outcomes operates, we merged the NSSO
database with three other small databases we constructed. The ﬁrst database includes census
data on the presence of schools in villages in the district in certain years, i.e. 1971, 1981, 1991,
and, 2001. The second database is taken from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE) and includes information on the number of schools per 100,000 inhabitants. This
information has been collected every ﬁve years since 1980.
The third database contains data on the beneﬁciaries of the MDM scheme, aggregating
individual-level data from NSSO at district level. Given that the programme was launched
only in the second half of 1990s and data are available only from 1999, we decided to extend
the analysis to the period after the one used for the main quantitative analysis. Precisely,
our data cover the period between 1999 and 2011, with the exclusion of 2010 when no NSSO
survey was conducted. This implied also extending the political dataset until 2011: for this
purpose we generated our indicators based on the database recently created by Bhavnani
(2014). While this analysis cannot speciﬁcally identify the relevance of this channel, it can
deﬁnitely provide information on whether, more in general, women in politics pay more
attention to the implementation of social and educational programmes like the MDM and
eventually target more girls.
3.4.2 Variables
The dependent variable of the main speciﬁcation is a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual has completed primary education. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics
for all variables: although about 66% of children have completed primary education, there is
considerable variation in time and across districts7. There is a clear positive trend in primary
school completion (Figure 1), which is in line with the aggregate ﬁgures reported by the
Ministry of Education.
7The number of observations used in this study is lower than that used in Clots-Figueras' one though here we cover 11
more years. This is because the 1999-2000 NSSO survey has larger sample size than the 2011-2012 survey: in the 16 states here
examined the population aged 14 or above in the former survey was nearly 500,000 against nearly 275,000 in the later.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES Mean SD Observations Source
Primary education or higher 0.66 0.48 96037 NSSO
Female 0.49 0.50 96037 NSSO
Urban 0.29 0.45 96037 NSSO
Scheduled Caste 0.20 0.40 96037 NSSO
Scheduled Tribe 0.08 0.27 96037 NSSO
Other Backward Caste 0.70 0.46 96037 NSSO
Hindu 0.83 0.38 96037 NSSO
Islamic 0.13 0.33 96037 NSSO
Christian 0.01 0.11 96037 NSSO
Other religions 0.03 0.18 96037 NSSO
DISTRICT VARIABLES (main models) Mean SD Observations Source
Share of constituencies won by women: previ-
ous 3-year average
0.038 0.07 7111 Pol. database
Share of constituencies won by women in close
m-f contests (2.5% margin): previous 3-year av-
erage
0.004 0.02 7111 Pol. database
Share of constituencies won in close m-f con-
tests (2.5% margin): previous 3-year average
0.007 0.03 7111 Pol. database
Share of constituencies reserved for SC/ST
members (previous 3-year average)
0.254 0.18 7111 Pol. database
Female proportion of population 0.482 0.01 7111 Census
Literacy rate: male (previous 3-year average) 0.532 0.16 7111 Census
Literacy rate: female (previous 3-year average) 0.283 0.17 7111 Census
DISTRICT VARIABLES (channels) Mean SD Observations Source
Proportion of villages with at least one primary
school
0.76 0.19 1101 CENSUS
Proportion of villages with at least one middle
school
0.24 0.21 1067 CENSUS
Primary schools per 100,00 inhabitants 76.90 34.06 850 CMIE
Middle & High schools per 100,000 inh. 18.35 12.03 726 CMIE
Mean number of MDMs per month (children
6-10)
4.91 5.19 1893 NSSO
Percentage of children aged 6-10 having one
MDMs per week
24.32 25.03 1893 NSSO
Percentage of children aged 6-10 having three
MDMs per week
21.88 23.34 1893 NSSO
Percentage of children aged 6-10 having four
MDMs per week
19.65 21.88 1893 NSSO
Source: our elaboration on data from diﬀerent sources
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Figure 3.1: Trends in people's probability to complete primary education
Source: our elaborations on NSSO data
Other individual-level covariates include sex and religion, whether the individual lives in
an urban or rural area, and whether he/she belongs to a Scheduled Caste (SC) or a Scheduled
Tribe (ST) or to another oﬃcially recognized backward caste.8
The central district-level variable is the female share of seats, calculated as a three-year
average. At a detailed level, we connect information on each individual's completion of pri-
mary education with information on the political structure of the district in the three years
before he/she started school. Our assumption is that the local political structure may aﬀect
educational achievements through investment choices, which means that it is a lagged eﬀect.
Moreover, using an average results in a more stable indicator. On average, women's represen-
tation is very low, at nearly 4%. The standard deviation is high, suggesting large diﬀerences
across districts.
8SCs and STs are communities who have suﬀered socio-economic deprivation due to discriminatory practices. They are
protected under articles 341 and 342 of the Indian Constitution.
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There could be other, time-variant district determinants of primary school completion.
As these could also be gender-diﬀerentiated we controlled in particular for male and female
literacy rates, in addition to the female proportion of the population. As Table 3.1 makes clear,
the male literacy rate (53%) is almost double the female literacy rate (28%). These data are
taken from the Indian census and have been interpolated for the period between two censuses.
Moreover, there are other variables reﬂecting the district political environment, which may
have substantial eﬀects on educational outcomes. Among them, particularly important is the
share of constituencies held by SC/ST members. Given that some constituencies were by
law reserved to SC/ST members throughout the whole period analysed, mostly based on
the SC/ST population share at district level, controlling for the share of constituencies held
by SC/ST members allows indirectly to control for SC/ST district population share, too.
This is because there are not many cases in which SC/ST candidates won in non-reserved
constituencies.9 Like for women's representation, also SC/ST representation is measured
with an average for the three years before an individual started primary school.
In order to analyze the channels through which women's representation aﬀects education,
we used:
(a) four variables relating to school buildings. We obtained data from the national census
on the proportion of villages with one primary school and the proportion of villages with
one middle school in the district. Data on the number of primary schools and the number of
middle or higher schools per 100,000 inhabitants were obtained from the CMIE;
(b) four diﬀerent indicators of MDM coverage, namely the mean number of free meals
taken by 6-10 year-old children10 in school and the percentage of the latter taking at least
one, three or four meals a week.11 These ﬁgures were calculated by aggregating data from
NSSO surveys at district level. Nearly 24% of school-age children took at least one meal a
week, with around 19% taking four meals a week. However, the mean monthly number of
meals is very low. This is because the scheme was not adopted in many districts, particularly
during the ﬁrst few years.
While the channels variables (a) have been used also in the study of Clots-Figueras (2012),
the variables related to the MDM management have not been so far utilized in association
9Our data show that the Pearson correlation between SC/ST population share and the share of constituencies held by SC/ST
members is at least 0.85 for every year.
10The question in the NSSO surveys refers to `free meals' in general and not speciﬁcally to the MDM scheme. While in
some cases children were entitled to school meals under a local program, in the vast majority of cases in 1999-2011, these were
provided under the oﬃcial MDM scheme.
11Unfortunately, we do not know whether children are enrolled in school, which means that this indicator underestimates
MDM coverage.
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with the district political variables.
3.4.3 Estimation strategy
The correlation between district characteristics, the likely presence of female politicians, and
educational outcomes is the main concern of our main econometric analysis. More progres-
sive districts are more likely to register high levels of female political representation and
educational attainments at the same time, therefore generating an `omitted variables bias'.
In order to alleviate this bias, we examined the recent literature on electoral models and
employed instrumental variable regression: the share of constituencies won by women in a
district was instrumented by the share of constituencies won by women in close contests with
men (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Clots-Figueras, 2012; Lee, 2008). Close contests
are deﬁned as elections in which a man beats a woman (as the runner-up) or vice versa by
a relatively small margin, set here at 2.5%12. In these cases, the result of the election will
depend more on random factors. In other words, a female victory in a close contest cannot
be interpreted as an indicator of a female-friendly electorate.
However, the presence of a close male-female contest is not random. In accordance with
the estimation strategy used in other studies focusing on Indian districts (Bhalotra and Clots-
Figueras, 2014; Clots-Figueras, 2012) in both the ﬁrst and second stages, we controlled for
the existence of close male-female contests in the district. The descriptive statistics of these
two variables are reported in Table 3.1.
In all models we used district-ﬁxed eﬀects to account for time-invariant district-speciﬁc
factors. Age-ﬁxed eﬀects were used for age-speciﬁc unobservable factors. As robustness check
we also included state-speciﬁc linear time trends and district-speciﬁc linear time trends.
3.5 Findings
3.5.1 From politics to educational outcomes
Is a larger proportion of female politicians associated with better educational performance?
The results obtained by using the diﬀerent models are shown in Table 3.2.
12This choice is motivated as follows: the narrower the margin, the more reliable is the hypothesis of a random electoral
outcome. As only those indicators with a 2.5% or 3.5% margin passed all the IV tests, we opted for the ﬁrst option.
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The (biased) OLS estimates are reported in the ﬁrst column, while all the following es-
timates are obtained with an IV approach. As expected, the coeﬃcient of the endogenous
variable is lower using the OLS model. Moreover, all the statistical tests show that the in-
strumental variable approach used in this paper works well: the share of constituencies won
by women in close male-female contests (our IV) is highly correlated with women's politi-
cal representation (our endogenous variable; see Table 3.3b). Moreover, the IV is not weak,
as conﬁrmed by the Anderson-Rubin Wald test (Table 3.3a). For this reason, only the IV
estimates were interpreted.
Model 2 shown in Table 3.2 includes individual controls as well as district-ﬁxed and age-
ﬁxed eﬀects. Women's political representation has a clear positive inﬂuence on the likelihood
of children completing primary education, though the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant only at the
0.17 level.
Table 3.2: Eﬀect of women's political representation on primary education completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV with dis-
trict controls
IV with state
time trends
IV with dis-
trict time
trends
Share of constituencies
won by women
-0.025 0.480 0.602* 0.557* 0.525*
(0.060) (0.343) (0.367) (0.338) (0.277)
Share of constituencies
won in close m-f contests
-0.401** -0.474** -0.445** -0.241
(0.198) (0.222) (0.207) (0.168)
Individual controls X X X X X
District controls NO NO X X X
District ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X X
Age ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X X
State-speciﬁc time trends NO NO NO X NO
District-speciﬁc time trends NO NO NO NO X
N 96037 96037 96037 96037 96037
adj. R2 0.258 0.255 0.255 0.259 0.267
Source: our elaboration on data from NSSO survey 2011-2012 and Clots-Figueras (2012) political data
Standard errors clustered at district level in parentheses
All estimates were carried out with age- and district-ﬁxed eﬀects
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3a: Tests for the validity of the instrumental variables
Test Statistics P-value
Correlation IV  endogenous variable
Shea Partial R2 (from the ﬁrst stage) 11.09 0.001
Underidentiﬁcation tests
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-sq(1)=10.57 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic Chi-sq(1)=11.09 0.001
Weak identiﬁcation test
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(1,218)= 2.32 0.13
IV= Share of constituencies won by women in close male-female contests.
Endogenous variable = Share of constituencies won by women.
Table 3.3b: First stage of the instrumental variable estimates (Table 3.2 column (2))
Share of constituencies
won by women
Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste -0.001
(0.001)
Other backward caste 0.000
(0.001)
Female 0.000
(0.000)
Urban 0.001**
(0.001)
Hindu 0.000
(0.001)
Islamic -0.001
(0.002)
Christian -0.006*
(0.003)
Share of constituencies won in close m-f con-
tests
0.052
(0.211)
Share of constituencies won by women in
close m-f contests
0.788***
(0.237)
(0.237)
Constant 0.001
(0.005)
N 96037
adj. R2 0.417
Standard errors clustered at district level in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 51
In the third model, female and male literacy rates, the female proportion of the population
and the SC/ST share of the population are added to account for other possible district-level
characteristics that may inﬂuence educational outcomes. The eﬀect of the proportion of
district seats won by women is now signiﬁcant, at the 0.10 level. This means that children
living in districts with a higher female representation are signiﬁcantly more likely to complete
primary education. The size of the coeﬃcient implies that, by increasing women's political
representation at district level by 10 percentage points, the probability of an individual
completing primary education will rise by nearly 6 percentage points. This is about 9% of
the total probability that an individual has to complete primary education. These results
are also robust to the inclusion of state-speciﬁc linear time trends (column 4, Table 3.2) and
district-speciﬁc linear time trends (column 5, Table 3.2).
As we also controlled for the SC/ST proportion of the district population, this is the
exclusive eﬀect of the politicians' gender, beyond the caste eﬀect. These results diﬀer from
those obtained in the key reference paper for this study, the one carried out by Clots-Figueras
(2012) with older data: she, in fact, did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the whole Indian
sample.
There are substantial diﬀerences between urban and rural areas in India in terms of infras-
tructure and standards of living. Only in recent years have the government and the private
sector tried to improve the state of the infrastructure in rural areas, thus narrowing the gap
with urban areas. For the above reasons, we performed separate estimates for the two areas
(Table 3.4).
The eﬀect of women's political political representation is positive in both the cases. How-
ever, in contrast with Clots-Figueras' (2012) results, we found a larger, though not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, eﬀect in rural areas. This might be due to lower average levels of education
in the latter areas.
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Table 3.4: Eﬀect of women's political representation on primary education completion: disaggregated results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Urban IV Rural IV Female IV Male
Share of constituencies won by women 0.259 0.627 1.087* 0.081
(0.319) (0.431) (0.642) (0.315)
Share of constituencies won in close m-f
contests
-0.046 -0.609** -0.670 -0.305*
(0.206) (0.272) (0.419) (0.182)
Individual-level control variables X X X X
District-level control variables X X X X
District ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X
Age ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X
N 37818 58219 47802 48235
adj. R2 0.187 0.263 0.295 0.185
Source: our elaboration on data from NSSO survey 2011-2012 and Clots-Figueras (2012) political data
Standard errors clustered at district level in parentheses
All estimates were carried out with age- and district-ﬁxed eﬀects
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The above results provide evidence of the validity of the citizen-candidate model of political
economy, given that a politician's identity plays an important role in relation to education.
Moreover, the ﬁndings appear to conﬁrm that women pay more attention to education than
men. We then decided to test another hypothesis from the literature: are women more
interested in girls' education? In order to answer this question, we disaggregated the analysis
by gender.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.4 show the results for the female and male sample respec-
tively. The diﬀerence is striking: female representation has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the probability of girls completing primary education, while the eﬀect is largely insignif-
icant for boys. Given the magnitude of the coeﬃcient, we may conclude that, on average,
an increase in female representation by 10 percentage points raises the likelihood of girls
completing the full cycle of primary school by almost 11 percentage points. This corresponds
to nearly 18% of the overall girls' probability to complete primary education. This seems to
suggest that politicians do have a special concern for children of the same gender or, at least,
for the most vulnerable segments of society, which in this case happen to be girls.
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3.5.2 From politics to educational inputs
The previous subsection revealed a positive correlation between the number of female politi-
cians and educational outcomes. But how does this relationship operate? What are the
channels? The following sections analyze two sets of pathways: school construction and
MDM coverage.
Table 3.5: Eﬀect of women's political representation on educational infrastructures
Prop. of villages with a school
in the districta
Schools per 100,000
inhabitantsb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Middle Primary Secondary/higher
Share of constituencies won
by women
0.438 0.087 25.592 -11.916
(0.420) (0.327) -(60.512) (8.767)
Share of constituencies in
close m-f contests
-0.002 -0.051 -20.272 6.754
(0.178) (0.152) (36.595) -(4.544)
District-level control vari-
ables
X X X X
District ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X
Age ﬁxed eﬀects X X X X
N 889 859 850 726
adj. R2 0.857 0.899 0.822 0.955
Source: our elaboration on data from Indian census, CMIE and Clots-Figueras (2012) political data
Standard errors clustered at district level in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a Source: Indian census; b Source: CMIE.
The ﬁrst part of Table 3.5 shows the estimates of the eﬀect of women's political represen-
tation on the proportion of villages with a school in the district. The coeﬃcients are always
positive, but far larger for primary schools. This would suggest that women politicians are
particularly interested in very basic education. However, the eﬀects are insigniﬁcant, at the
0.10 level. The models with the number of primary and secondary/higher schools per 100,000
inhabitants as dependent variables produce similar results. The proportion of district seats
won by women is not a signiﬁcant explanatory variable: in the latter case, its coeﬃcient is
actually negative.
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The MDM scheme is a highly important social welfare program in India. For this reason,
we would expect politicians paying more attention to children's education and nutrition to
invest in the program and manage it better. As the MDM is relatively new and as eﬀorts to
make the budget allocation more transparent were not made until recently, we only have data
concerning its coverage. Our analysis shows that there is positive but insigniﬁcant correlation
between female political representation and MDM coverage (Table 3.6). Once we disaggregate
the MDM coverage by gender, we notice positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of women's political
representation for two of the four indicators examined. Therefore, this analysis provides some,
though limited, evidence of a particular interest of female politicians towards educational
programmes like the MDM. In conclusion, we investigated some possible channels and found
that only those related to the implementation of the MDM and its speciﬁc gender-related
targeting help, to some extent, to explain the ﬁndings in the main estimates. There are
two possible explanations for this result. The ﬁrst is that we did not have adequate data
to consider the most important pathways. In particular, the following weaknesses must be
acknowledged: 1. Decisions taken by state assemblies are more important than those taken
at state assembly constituency level in terms of the budget allocated to diﬀerent aspects of
education. 2. States also decide whether and when to join the MDM scheme. There is thus
limited room for MLAs to aﬀect MDM coverage. MLAs play a more important role in the
management of the scheme. For example, it would be interesting to see whether districts with
a larger number of female MLAs stick more closely to the national guidelines for the MDM
scheme. These include a more participatory approach, a more transparent management of
funds, and respecting the nutritional contents of the meals. However, no data are currently
available on these practices. 3. We were not able to take account of other relevant channels,
such as those relating to school quality. The second interpretation is that higher levels of
representation of women can ensure higher educational levels  especially for women - via
a demonstration eﬀect. Women in oﬃce can become role models for other women, raising
their educational aspirations and therefore improving their attainments, without necessarily
pushing forward general education policies. Empirical evidence of this role model eﬀect is
found in India (Beaman et al., 2012) as well as in other countries (Powley, 2007).
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper has a threefold objective: (1) to analyze whether politicians' gender has a bearing
on the educational achievements of the residents of the districts in which they were elected;
(2) to understand whether politicians are more sensitive to the needs of people of the same
gender; (3) to explore the possible channels through which these relationships work. By
applying an instrumental variable approach to a dataset obtained by merging individual data
with political variables for Indian districts, we show that women's political representation has
a substantial eﬀect on the probability of children completing primary education. An increase
in women's political representation at district level by 10 percentage points can produce
a rise of nearly 6 percentage points in the likelihood of an individual completing the full
cycle of primary education. The study of Clots-Figueras (2012)), from which we took the
identiﬁcation strategy, pointed only on the importance of women's political representation in
urban areas.
A disaggregated analysis reveals that women's political representation raises the educa-
tional achievements of girls signiﬁcantly more than that of boys. This is a completely novel
result, as this aspect had never been examined in previous works. Finally, we investigated two
possible macro-channels through which women's political representation might aﬀect educa-
tional outcomes, i.e. the presence of school buildings and the coverage of the MDM scheme.
Our results show that the ﬁrst channel does not help to explain the relationship. In contrast,
we detect a positive, though insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of women's political representation on the
MDM coverage and, above all, some positive and signiﬁcant evidence for the sample of girls.
This suggests that female politicians may be particularly interested in girls' education.
Overall, the paper provides initial evidence of the contribution of female political repre-
sentation on educational attainments especially among girls. This occurs partly through the
improvement of their access to educational and welfare programs like the MDM, while an
increase of school infrastructures does not appear as an important mediating factor. However,
an in-depth understanding of the comprehensive pathways through which women's represen-
tation in politics impacts on children's education requires further research. Our analysis, in
fact, cannot test other important channels and cannot rely on frequent, high-quality data.
Provided these limitations, our ﬁndings are compatible with existing literature that points to
the role model eﬀect. According to this explanation, the presence of women in important
political roles itself helps girls and women challenge prevalent stereotypes and increase their
aspirations, including educational aspirations. Though we cannot test it empirically, the role
model is likely to play an important role in explaining our ﬁndings.
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This paper engages in a broader debate on the eﬀects of women's political representation.
Section 3.2 reviews the existing literature in India, which shows that female political repre-
sentation is associated with lower poverty levels in several dimensions, though the evidence is
not always clear. Moreover, one could argue that female political representation is beneﬁcial
to democracy as it forms the basis for a more pluralistic political life, given that more `voices'
can be heard. As Sen argues (2005, 240), an increase in women's (political) agency boosts
`the freedom to question established values and traditional priorities'. This paper shows that
it can also be important in raising educational levels in a country characterized by wide
educational inequalities and, as a consequence, in enhancing women's empowerment.
This means that multiple policy objectives could be met with one policy tool. However,
caution needs to be exercised in adopting quick ﬁxes such as gender quotas. The, 20-year
experience with female political reservation in Indian Gram panchayats (Kalaramadam, 2018)
and the experience of a neighbouring country like Bangladesh (Panday, 2008) show that
enhancing women's substantial role in the political arena cannot be achieved simply by
waving the magic wand of gender quotas. Female political reservation can help women to be
heard, but it has to be integrated with multiple interventions aimed at diminishing gender
gaps in terms of education, employment opportunities and access to key assets (Doss et al.,
2012). Otherwise, there is a serious risk that women with little experience and low levels
of education will occupy seats in state assemblies, where they can be manipulated by male
politicians. Another risk is that only women from economic and political elites will be elected,
thus exacerbating the discrimination suﬀered by women from the lowest classes. All these
issues have been under debate in India since a few years, with the approval of The Women's
Reservation Bill, which aims to reserve one third of the seats in the Lower House and the
state assemblies for women, by the Upper House in March 2010. However, given that the
Lower House never voted on it, the Bill lapsed in 2014.
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Chapter 4
Political Reservation for Scheduled
Castes and Business Exclusion:
Examining Political Quotas' Eﬀects on
Private Sector Entrepreneurship,1990 to
20071
Abstract
This study examines the preferences of political leaders elected through the Scheduled Castes (SC) electoral quotas.
For this purpose, this paper focuses on the preferences of SC politicians in state assemblies on business outcomes in
their constituency. The study chooses possible business outcomes in the private non-agricultural sectors that directly
aﬀect the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and the other castes. These include: entrepreneurship; entrepreneurs' access
to public goods; entrepreneurs' dependence on family labor; sectoral mobility; employment of SC in other caste
enterprises; SC entrepreneurs' ability to hire workers from other castes and patronage. The study covers the 15 largest
Indian states during the period between 1990 and 2007. It ﬁnds that SC leaders do not promote inclusion of SC
members in the private sector businesses and do not aﬀect the overall business outcomes of the other castes. However,
this study ﬁnds that SC leaders are involved in patronage in the rent-seeking sectors.
Key words: Scheduled Castes, Private Sector. JEL code: J20, J23, I10
1The paper was presented at the Development Economics Seminar, University of Göttingen. I thank all the participants
of the seminar for their valuable comments. My sincere thanks to Prof. Klasen for providing a detailed comment in shaping
the paper. I am thankful to Prof. David Blakeslee and Prof. Ritam Chaurey for their guidance and help. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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4.1 Introduction
A growing literature has examined the preference of Indian politicians (Lehne et al., 2018;
Jensenius, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2017). These studies focus on the preference of members
of legislative assemblies in their constituency. Given that, members of legislative assemblies
(MLAs) have dual functions, passing laws at the state assemblies and dealing with con-
stituency demands. The reason recent studies focus on the preference in the constituency is
that members of legislative assemblies spend more time on constituency works than on their
legislative role (Jensenius, 2015; Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015; Chopra, 1996). Political
reform also supports leaders to focus on issues in the constituency. Since the early 1990s,
MLAs have had access to discretionary development funds through the Member of Legisla-
tive Assembly Constituency Development Scheme to ﬁx their constituency speciﬁc issues. In
addition to that, in the topics related to constituency, leaders may have discretion on the
selection of beneﬁciaries and commissioning projects.
Jensenius (2015) is the ﬁrst study that examines the preference of Scheduled Caste leaders
in the Indian state assemblies at a constituency level. This study ﬁnds that these leaders do
not favor these castes in literacy and employment, nor do they aﬀect the eﬃcacy of the
political system. Asher and Novosad (2017) ﬁnd that members of legislative state assemblies
favor entrepreneurs of their political party through the inﬂuence and business performance
through the actions of government bureaucrats. Lehne et al. (2018) ﬁnd that in the case of
road projects, members of legislative assemblies use their inﬂuence to commission projects to
contractors of their caste. Although Jensenius (2015) studies the SC politicians' preference,
she mentions that not focusing on the outcomes relevant to politicians might be a limitation
of her study. But the other two studies (Lehne et al., 2018; Asher and Novosad, 2017) suggest
that business outcomes are relevant to the politicians.
The literature presents possible intentions and outcomes that arise due to the leaders'
preferences. The previous literature argues that politicians hold public oﬃce for their private
return, to serve their patrons, adversely aﬀect the eﬃcacy of the political system and they
favor their castes to reduce the discrimination. The main research question that emerged
from literature is whether or not Scheduled Castes members of legislative assemblies inﬂuence
business outcomes in favor of their whole communities or only to their patrons. In this paper I
extend Jensenius (2015) to look at the eﬀect the eﬀect of SC reservation on business outcomes.
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This paper ﬁnds that SC business presence in the rent-seeking business sectors, gas and
water, are higher in the reserved constituencies than the unreserved counterfactual con-
stituencies. Thus, it shows that they do inﬂuence the business outcomes in favor of their
patrons. However, this paper ﬁnds that reservation for Scheduled Castes at state assemblies
shows no support towards their castes in private sector businesses.
There are multiple reasons why Scheduled Castes politicians might not aﬀect the SC
entrepreneurs in their constituencies. Firstly, Scheduled Castes are historically not part of
the business sector. Hence, Scheduled Caste leaders lack business experience, which may be a
reason for not leading their communities into business. Secondly, the inﬂuence of established
people in business in the political parties would stop any favoritism towards Scheduled Castes,
in order to avoid business competition. Thirdly, to survive in the business, the Scheduled
Castes might not experience a conducive environment, given other castes' attitudes or actions.
Apart from the reason that politicians could inﬂuence business outcomes, SC standing
in the private sector also encourages the study of business outcomes. In the modern Indian
economy, exclusion of Scheduled Castes in the private non-agriculture sector is a sign of failure
in addressing caste discrimination. In 1991, India initiated several reforms to transform its
national economy to an open one with a greater reliance on market forces (Ahluwalia, 2002).
As a result, private non-agricultural sectors emerged as an engine of Indian economic growth.
On the development aspects, critiques were raised by several researchers (Damodaran, 2008;
Deshpande and Sharma, 2016; Iyer et al., 2013; Jodhka, 2010; Thorat and Sadana, 2009;
Varshney, 2007, 2012) that the beneﬁts of rapid economic growth from reforms in 1991
have not been shared equally among the diﬀerent sections of society. The lower caste social
group, the SC, are especially under-represented in the ownership of private non-agricultural
enterprises (Iyer et al., 2013). Besides their weakness in entrepreneurship, SC members also
have low employment rates in private enterprises. It is the case that entrepreneurs prefer
to hire labor from their own caste (MSME, 2006-07). SC's low rates of employment and
underrepresentation in entrepreneurship in private non-agricultural sectors signal continuing
social exclusion in the fast-growing Indian economy. Consequently, SC leaders advocate for
fairness and equal opportunity in the private sector (Nigam, 2002). Their collective demand
focuses on aﬃrmative legislative actions in favor of SC, such as job reservation in the formal
private sector (Lerche, 2008).
Indian constitutional and theoretical models expect that SC politicians could lead as
an agent of change in eliminating caste discrimination. The Indian constitution guarantees
political representation of SCs in three spheres of government: central, state, and local bodies.
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This mandated political representation in governments is expected to bring policies in favor
of their castes. Theoretical predictions are ambiguous about the preferences of politicians
from underrepresented ethnic quotas. Traditional theoretical models (Downs, 1957; Arrow,
1951; Mayhew, 1974; Fenno and Fenno Jr, 1978; Kingdon, 1989; Cox and McCubbins, 2005)
assume that politicians are likely to be vote-seeking or be interested in holding oﬃce in future
elections as well. Highly political competition does not allow SC politicians to favor their
castes, and SC politicians are more likely to follow the command of parties' high command.
An alternate view, the citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley et al.,
2004; Horowitz, 2001), predicts that politicians are assumed to act in favor of their ethnic
group.
I use the Economic Census (EC) conducted in 1990, 1998, and 2005 and the 2006-07 Micro,
Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) census results. Both the censuses have details about
the enterprise owners' caste, and report the location of the enterprises at the village level. The
Economic Census covers all the non-agricultural enterprises in the country. I use the Economic
Censuses to measure SC entrepreneurs' business positions in non-agriculture sectors. The
MSME census covers both manufacturing and services enterprises. However, MSME does
not cover manufacturing enterprises with an investment of more than 100 million Rupees in
plant and machinery, and it also excludes service enterprises with an investment of more than
Rs 50 million in equipment. Most of the business outcome variables are constructed using
ECs. The MSME census provides detailed information about the caste of labor, information
that is not available in the EC. The use of the MSME census is to measure the employment
of SC members in other caste enterprises and SC entrepreneurs' ability to hire labor from
upper castes.
Institution design in reserving the constituencies for SC allows selecting plausible coun-
terfactuals constituencies for reserved constituencies. The Delimitation Commission of India
is a high powered body in charge of choosing the reserved constituencies. The reserved con-
stituencies are not selected randomly. To overcome the selection bias, Jensenius (2015) ex-
ploits features in the institution design and employs a matching method to pair each reserved
constituency to a general constituency. I use the same counterfactual general constituencies
selected by Jensenius (2015) as a control group for reserved constituencies. The empirical
strategy estimates the eﬀect of political reservation by comparing the diﬀerences in the busi-
ness outcomes between the reserved and control constituencies.
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4.2 Background on Caste, Politics, and Business
Caste discrimination persists in the modern Indian economy. The Indian caste system his-
torically prevents members of lower castes from using public goods and forces them to do
low-proﬁle jobs (Bob, 2007). In 2006, because of caste, SCs were not allowed to use selected
public streets (Girard, 2018). Centuries of the caste-based social organisation have left a
legacy of inequality in access to land, education, business ownership and occupation (Desai
and Dubey, 2012). For example, wages are lower for SCs than for the upper castes. Lower
castes have less business ownership in the non-agriculture sector. Iyer et al. (2013) show
lower castes' under-representation in business, and that SC entrepreneurs have lower access
to public goods. Lower caste people still face a higher incidence of poverty as compared to
members of the upper castes (Panagariya and Mukim, 2014).
To intervene the caste discrimination, the Indian government classify the complex caste
structure to a few groups. The Indian traditional caste system classiﬁes people based on their
occupational status, known as Jati, and most Hindu surnames refer to their Jati (Dunning and
Nilekani, 2013). The Hindus inherit their Jati identity from parents, and Jati is endogamous
(Olcott, 1944). The Indian constitution classiﬁes traditional social divisions (Jati) into four
oﬃcial social groups, Scheduled Tribes (ST), Scheduled Castes (SC), Other Backward Castes
(OBC), Backward Castes (BC), and socioeconomically progressed castes which do not have
an oﬃcial classiﬁcation name. The constitution caste classiﬁcation is primarily used in various
government programs and to carry out aﬃrmative actions for lower castes.
Researchers show great interest in studying the eﬀect of aﬃrmation actions, especially
several attempts in studying the impact of political representation. Since independence, po-
litical support for lower castes resulted in several aﬃrmative action measures, including:
quotas in public sectors jobs; higher education and political representation; and special pro-
tection status in the justice system. There are Indian constitutional guarantees for political
representation of lower castes at three levels of governments: central, state and local. Polit-
ical representation takes an essential place among the other aﬃrmative actions, as political
representation is meant to lobby new policy measures for lower castes. Several studies (Besley
et al., 2004; Bardhan et al., 2010a; Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004a; Dunning and Nilekani,
2013; Chin and Prakash, 2011; Pande, 2003; Jensenius, 2015) have tested whether or not
electoral quotas for lower castes erase the harmful discrimination in the society and induce
favor toward lower castes.
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At the lowest level of, village, political representation, studies (Besley et al., 2004; Bardhan
et al., 2010a; Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004a; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013) found that
positive eﬀect of electoral quotas on lower castes at the village level. SC pradhans (deﬁne)
divert allocation of government welfare schemes towards SC households (Besley et al., 2004).
In West Bengal, villages headed by SC/ST pradhans tend to receive more beneﬁts from local
government and employment program beneﬁts are redistributed towards SC/ST households
(Bardhan et al., 2010a). SC pradhans invest a larger share of public goods in SC hamlets than
do non-SC pradhans (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004a). Political incentives of SC pradhans
limit the distributive eﬀects towards SC members (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013).
At the state level, SC's political representation, as an eﬀect of electoral quotas, manifests
via two channels, their legislative role and constituency work.
The earlier studies Chin and Prakash (2011); Pande (2003) have examined the legislative
role. Pande (2003) ﬁnds that SC/ST politicians in the Indian state assemblies use their
participation in legislative action to increase the welfare expenditure to SC/ST. The ﬁndings
of Chin and Prakash (2011) show that SC MLA representation in state assemblies does not
aﬀect SC poverty, whereas reservation for STs helps to reduce their castes' poverty. They
argue that political representation for lower castes does not guide what outcome the leaders
may bring to their castes. Thus, the choice of favor is up to the leaders to decide. The
empirical expectation of studies assumes that lower caste leaders favor their caste in the
ﬁelds where lower castes have a low level of status.
In the MLAs workload share, constituency work has taken a considerable part. Political
reform in India gives more resources and encouragement to MLAs to focus on constituency
speciﬁc issues, with the legislative role declining. In the 1980s, the state government of
Maharashtra allocated one million Rs to a discretionary fund for MLAs to spend on their local
constituency (Blair, 2017; Oommen, 2010). In the late 1990s, many other state governments
also followed Maharashtra's example and allocated discretionary funds to MLAs, known as
the MLA Local Area Development Scheme Fund (MLALADS). MLAs' primary task is to
represent their constituency in the state assembly. Chopra (1996) reports that only 3% of
MLAs in the state assemblies consider their assembly work (passing legislative bills) as a
primary duty. Jensenius and Suryanarayan (2015) ﬁnd that time spent on legislative actions
are also falling. The legislative actions are formed by the head of the political parties or
MLAs holding a high position in the party.
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Studying the impact of constitution works is relatively recent as compared to the studies
on the legislative role. Jensenius (2015) is the ﬁrst attempt to look at the constituency-level
eﬀect of SC leader in state assemblies. Jensenius (2015) ﬁnds that the SC leader eﬃciency
level is equal to that of other political leaders. The level of public goods available in the
reserved constituencies is comparable to that of the general constituencies. Although her
study attempts to look at the preference towards SC in education and employment, the
author remarks that the limitation of the study is in not being able to look at various
development outcomes relevant to the SC. Jensenius (2015) shows that the availability of
public goods in reserved constituencies has not worsened, but whether the public goods in
the reserved constituencies are shared equally with SC is not clear. This compels special
attention, because the problem in sharing public goods with lower castes persist in some
villages, as of 2006, SCs still face barriers even in accessing public streets (Girard, 2018).
Political reality urges an examination of whether SC politicians' actions favor patrons or all
SC entrepreneurs. Most of the elected political leaders in India, have criminal charges against
them (Dutta and Gupta, 2012; Aidt et al., 2011). Clientelism and vote buying practices are
typical in India (Jeﬀrey, 2002; Wilkinson, 2006; Schneider, 2014). The criminal or corrupt
candidates exploit voter tastes. The voters prefer immediate material beneﬁts oﬀered by the
candidate over good governance, or they aﬃliate with the corrupt candidate to seek patron-
age, known as the patronage hypothesis (Banerjee et al., 2014). In developing and developed
countries, there are several pieces of evidence to show that the politicians' exploitative behav-
ior in the private sector supports their patrons. There are several ways they can help patrons:
by protecting the corruptive business practices of patrons (Kurer, 1993); through the mis-
use the public money in the business of patrons (Robinson and Torvik, 2005); and helping
to get opportunities for patrons in rent-seeking or monopolised businesses (Van Biezen and
Kopecký, 2007).
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4.3 Empirical Design and Data
4.3.1 Empirical Design
The empirical strategy for identifying the eﬀect of political reservation for SC is a matching
method. To address the selection bias in the non-random assignment of reserved constituen-
cies for SC in the state assemblies, I follow the empirical strategy applied by Jensenius (2015).
The Delimitation Commission is the high powered constitutional body responsible for
drawing state assemblies' constituencies and selecting the reserved constituencies for SC. Af-
ter independence, India constituted four Delimitation Commissions, in the years 1952, 1962,
1972 and 2002. The drawn boundaries of the ﬁrst two commissions were revised in decennial.
Since the third commission, the Indian government has frozen constituency boundaries for
more than 30 years. The reason for the long period during which the constituencies' bound-
aries were frozen was to encourage family planning. The declaration of the third Delimitation
Commission on constituency boundaries and reservation status was not altered between 1974-
2007. The study period of this paper looks at the reservation eﬀect during the reference years
of the third Delimitation Commission.
The proportion of its SC population determines the allocation and number of reserved
seats in a state and a district. The following two criteria for reserving constituencies for SC
allow to select counterfactual constituencies:
(1) Reserved constituencies are ones where SC have high populations and (2) Reserved
constituencies should be spatially dispersed, ie: two reserved constituencies should not be
next to each other. It is well known that districts with large lower caste populations are the
backward districts in India. Therefore, the selection is biased; reserved constituencies are not
comparable to general constituencies.
Jensenius (2015) ﬁnds that step-wise selection process has resulted in slippage among
many of the highest SC populated constituencies. That is, if a district is eligible for two
reserved constituencies, the second highest SC population may not be chosen because of
the second criteria, of not being contiguous to each other. The slipped constituencies with
highly SC populated constituencies served as plausible counterfactuals. Out of 483 reserved
constituencies, it was possible to get close counterfactual ones for 324 reserved constituencies.
I limit my analysis to 317 pairs from the Jensenius (2015) list of 324 pairs of reserved and
general constituencies. The average diﬀerence in the proportion of SC population (in the
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census for 1971) between the 317 pair of reserved and counterfactual constituencies is 1.6
percentage. In various indicators, such as SC literacy and employment, and public good
access of SC, the 324 pairs are balanced in the pre-reservation period (as per Census 1971).
4.3.2 Data
The data for this paper were from the following sources: (1) Economic Census (EC); (2)
Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises census (MSME); (3) Population Census; (4) online
data of Jensenius (2015); and night light data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Pro-
gram Optical Linescan System (DMSP-OLS). I construct the night light data at the village
level using ArcGIS tools. These censuses mentioned above provide location details at the
village level. Village administrative boundaries are at a lower level than those of state assem-
bly constituencies. Therefore, it is possible to construct the variables of interests from these
censuses at the State assemblies' constituency level. I used the Economic Censuses conducted
in the years 1990, 1998, and 2005 and constructed the village level panel data. The Economic
Census of India is a complete enumeration of all establishments except those engaged in crop
production and plantations; there is no minimum ﬁrm size, and both formal and informal
establishments are included. The Economic Censuses provide detailed information on the
location and industrial classiﬁcation of each enterprise, the number of workers employed, the
mix of family and hired labor, sources of ﬁnance, and the caste category of the enterprise
owner.
I use the MSME census conducted in 2006-07 and exploit the enterprises' cross-section
data. The MSME census covers most of the non-agricultural sector and excludes the large
enterprises. The enterprises included in the MSME census account for 90 % of employment in
the non-agricultural sector. The advantage of the MSME census is that it provides information
about the owners' castes and those of the workers employed.
EC and MSME census data have the advantage that they provide the basic facts about
the business outcomes related to SC, as well as location details of the unit of the survey at
the village level. However, one limitation of these censuses is that we do not have baseline
information. The reservation boundaries are ﬁxed for the period between 1974-2007 by the
Delimitation Commission Act of 1972. I assume that pre-reservation period business outcomes
are the same between the reserved and control constituencies.
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I use the 1991 Population Census to calculate the caste population at the village level. In
addition to that, I use the village concordance directories from the Population Census for the
years 1991 and 2001. One of the signiﬁcant challenges is the merging of the EC census village
names across 1990, 1998 and 2005. EC 1990 village codes are comparable to the Population
Census 1991 and EC 2005 village codes are the same as in the Population Census 2001.
Village concordance directories from population censuses helped merge the EC 1990 and EC
2005. However, EC 1998 village coding system follows neither the Population Census 1991
nor the Population Census 2001. Therefore, I used fuzzy matching algorithms to match the
village name of EC 1998 with village name of Population census 2001.
I used shapeﬁles of state assembly constituencies and village geographic coordinates for
population census 2001 to link the state assembly constituency to the village. Constituencies'
pre-reservation period data, Population Census 1971, are taken from online data of Jensenius
(2015). The primary data work in Jensenius (2015) are digitalizing village data from the
1971 Population Census report, merged with state assembly constituencies as drawn by
the Delimitation Act of 1972, and merged with 1971 Population Census data and the 2001
Population Census.
Jensenius (2015) selects the counterfactuals general constituencies for 324 reserved con-
stituencies by exploiting the institutional design used in picking the reserved constituencies.
Using 1971 census variables, she shows that there is a balance of observable variables in the
selected 324 pairs. I was able to get a link to the Economic Census data for 317 out of 324
pairs of reserved and general constituencies. I use village level data from the Economic Cen-
sus. The number of villages falling within 319 pairs of reserved and general constituencies
were 105,000. On an average, each state assembly has around 160 villages.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Year Reserved Control Reserved Control Reserved
minus
Control1
Mean No. of Villages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2)
Share SC Population 1971 24.77 23.46 53064 52638 1.60***
(0.22)
Entrepreneurship
Share of SC Enterprises in
a village
1990,1998
& 2005
10.29 9.98 140116 139432 0.31
(0.20)
% SC ﬁrms with only one
person
1990,1998
& 2005
67.37 67.06 62233 61085 0.31
(0.38)
Average of employment in
SC ﬁrms
1990,1998
& 2005
1.66 1.61 62233 61085 0.06
(0.06)
Access to public services
% SC ﬁrms with bank ﬁ-
nance
1998 &
2005
2.36 2.45 42057 41236 -0.09
(0.12)
% SC ﬁrms with govern-
ment ﬁnance
1999 &
2005
3.33 3.72 42057 41236 -0.39
(0.24)
% SC ﬁrms with electricity 1990,1998
& 2005
5.4 5.5 62233 61085 -0.10
(0.12)
Family workers dependency
% of family employment in
SC ﬁrms
1990,1998
& 2006
88.92 88.93 62233 61085 -0.01
(0.38)
% of child labour in SC
ﬁrms
1999 &
2005
1.55 1.57 42057 41236 -0.01
(0.11)
% of girls child labour in
SC ﬁrms
1999 &
2005
0.42 0.38 42057 41236 0.04
(0.05)
Sector mobility
Share of SC ﬁrms in low
proﬁle sector
1990 &
1998
0.13 0.15 67074 66892 -0.03
(0.02)
Share SC ﬁrms in cleaning
and sanitation
1990,1998
& 2005
0.01 0.01 91028 90347 0.002
(0.003)
Share of SC ﬁrms in
transport-animals
1990 &
1998
0.02 0.03 67074 66892 -0.008
(0.0105)
Caste and employment Mean No. of ﬁrms
% of SC labour in SC
owned ﬁrm
2006-07 0.656 0.687 3996 4224 -0.0307
(0.022)
% of Non-SC labour in SC
owned ﬁrm
2006-07 0.343 0.312 3996 4224 0.030
(0.022)
% of SC labour in Non-SC
owned ﬁrm
2006-07 0.075 0.071 38521 38510 0.004
(0.006)
% of Non-SC labour in
Non-SC owned ﬁrm
2006-07 0.924 0.928 38521 38510 -0.004
(0.006)
Note 1) The reported coeﬃcients are mean diﬀerences between reserved and control constituencies, from
bivariate OLS regression models estimated separately for each variable. Standard errors are clustered by
state level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.1 shows the mean comparison of the reserved and Control (selected counterfactuals
from general constituencies) constituencies for the selected variables used in the analysis.
Column 1 and 2 report the mean values of reserved and control constituencies, respectively.
Column 3 and 4 show the number of observations (village or ﬁrm) in the reserved and
control constituencies, respectively. Variables of interest from EC are reported under four
board sections: entrepreneurship, accessing public services, the dependency of family labor
and sectoral mobility. It is not possible to consider all of the 105,000 villages in the analysis.
Because around 89,752 villages have at least one non-agriculture ﬁrm, and out of these villages
only 41,104 villages have at least one SC owned ﬁrm. The variable, the share of SC ﬁrms in the
village, measuring the business presence of SC is practical for the 89,752 villages which had
some presence of non-agricultural activity. The rest of the variables in the Economic Census
measure the SC business characteristics in the village. The SC business characteristics variable
is possible to construct for the 41,104 villages where SC have participated in business. The
number observation for variables also changes, since the EC does not report selected variables
in all three census years (1990, 1998 and 2005). The outcome variables measured using the
MSME census were described at the ﬁrm level. I use the fourth MSME Census conducted in
the year 2006-07 to measure owners' preferences in hiring labor from their castes, as reported
under the section of Caste and Employment.
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I estimate an empirical model at all three levels: 1) ﬁrm, 2), village and 3) constituency:
Yvt = α + βRc + γXv + ζs + ϕt + ηct (4.1)
The equation 1, where Yvt are outcome variables in village v in year t. c represents con-
stituency. The coeﬃcient of interest is β: it tells whether the reserved constituencies are
diﬀerent than the counterfactual constituencies. Rc is the reservation dummy, Xv is the con-
trol variable, share of SC population in the village, 1991. ζs and ϕt are state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects respectively. The error term, ηvt is clustered at block level. The results of equation 1
are presented in tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.12 and 4.13.
Yct = α + βRc + γXc + ζs + ϕt + ηct (4.2)
The equation 2, Yct are outcome variables in constituency c in year t. c represents con-
stituency. The coeﬃcient of interest is β: it tells whether the reserved constituencies are
diﬀerent than the counterfactual constituencies. Rc is the reservation dummy, Xc is the con-
trol variable, share of SC population in the constituency, 1991. ζs and ϕt are state and year
ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. The error term, ηct is clustered at state level. The results of equation
2 are presented in tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10.
Yi = α + βRc + γXv + ζs + ηi (4.3)
In equation 3, Yi are outcome variables in ﬁrm i in village v. c represents constituency.
The coeﬃcient of interest is β: it tells whether the reserved constituencies are diﬀerent than
the counterfactual constituencies. Rc is the reservation dummy, Xv is the control variable,
share of SC population in the village, 1991. ζs is the state ﬁxed eﬀect. The error term, ηi is
clustered at block level. The results of equation 3 are presented in table 4.11.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Private sector
Table 4.2 shows that the eﬀect of political reservation for schedule castes leaders has no
eﬀect on overall private sector development or economic growth and, SCs entrepreneurship
in the non-agriculture sector. Columns 1 and 4 show that political reservation has no eﬀect
on the total number of enterprises and the total number of emploees in reserved villages,
respectively. Columns 2 and 3 show that political reservation has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the number of SCs enterprises and share of SCs enterprises in the reserved villages. Columns
5 and 6 show that political reservation has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the number of SCs
enterprises employment and share of SCs enterprises employment in the reserved villages.
Column 7 shows that political reservation does not aﬀect the night light intensity (a proxy
for economic activity) in the reserved villages.
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4.4.2 Entrepreneurship
Table 4.3 shows that eﬀect of political reservation for schedule castes leaders has no eﬀects
on the various entrepreneurship characteristics of non-SCs and SCs. Columns 1 and 2 show
that political reservation has no eﬀects on the share of one-person enterprises owned by
non-SCs and SCs, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show that political reservation has no
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the share of no-outside workers' enterprises owned by non-SCs and SCs,
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show that political reservation has no signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
share of at least one outside workers' enterprises owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
Columns 5 and 6 show that political reservation has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the average
employment of enterprises owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
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4.4.3 Access to facilities and government support
Table 4.4 shows that political reservation for schedule castes leaders has no eﬀects on the
non-SCs and SCs ﬁrms access to facilities and government support. Columns 1 and 2 show
that political reservation has no eﬀects on the ﬁrms access to electricity, owned by non-SCs
and SCs, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show that political reservation has no eﬀects on the
ﬁrms likely to get ﬁnancial support from the banks, owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
Columns 5 and 6 show that political reservation has no eﬀects on ﬁrm chance to get ﬁnancial
support from government programmes to the ﬁrms, owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
Columns 7 and 8 show that political reservation has no eﬀects on the ﬁrms ability to be
registered, owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
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4.4.4 Family workers
Table 4.5 shows that political reservation has no eﬀects on non-SCs and SCs ﬁrms dependency
on family workers and child labor. The expected results with political reservation is that SC
entrepreneurs are able to hire laborers freely from the market and are less dependent on family
labor. The Scheduled Castes enterprises are highly dependent on the family members (both
adult and children) for labor. The caste system prevents hiring workers from other castes.
It has two adverse eﬀects: it prevents them from entering into many sectors and results in
less educational investments for the successive generation. SC children have unequal access
to primary education(Desai et al., 2010) and this is also the reason for SCs ﬁrms have higher
incidence of child labour as compared to non-SC ﬁrm. Columns 1 and 2 show that political
reservation has no eﬀects on the average share of family workers in ﬁrms, owned by non-SCs
and SCs, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show that political reservation has no eﬀects on the
use of child laborers in ﬁrms, owned by non-SCs and SCs, respectively. Columns 5 and 6
show that political reservation has no eﬀects on the use of girl child laborers in ﬁrms, owned
by non-SCs and SCs, respectively.
Table 4.5: Eﬀect of SC reservation on family labor
Share of family
worker in ﬁrms
Share of child
worker in ﬁrms
Share of girl child
worker in ﬁrms
non-SC SC non-SC SC non-SC SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SC reserved 0.0597 -0.113 0.0388 -0.00895 0.0512 0.0338
(0.514) (0.436) (0.118) (0.134) (0.0445) (0.0481)
Share of SC
Population in
1991
-0.0222*** 0.00596 -0.00253* -0.00396*** -0.00119* -0.00186***
(0.00667) (0.00668) (0.00132) (0.00153) (0.00061) (0.00061)
Observations 264,599 123,313 172,051 83,291 172,051 83,291
R-squared 0.071 0.054 0.03 0.023 0.02 0.011
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Block Block Block Block Block Block
Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4.5 Business presence in traditional exploitative sectors
Table 4.6 shows that political reservation has no eﬀects on exploitative sectors. The ex-
pected results of political reservation is that SC entrepreneurs are able to move away from
the traditional exploitative sectors. Cleaning and sanitation, animal-powered transport, and
human-powered transport are low proﬁle (paid) sectors, where SC are historically exploited
via debt bondage and slavery. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the coeﬃcient is negative as
expected for all sectors, but not statistically signiﬁcant. The columns 1,3 and 5 show that
political reservation has no eﬀect on number of non-SC enterprises in exploitative sectors.
Table 4.6: Eﬀect of SC reservation on traditional exploitative sector(Number of ﬁrms
Dependent
Variables
Cleaning and sanitation Animal-powered trans-
port
Man-powered transport
non-SC SC non-SC SC non-SC SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SC reserved -0.000925 -0.000838 -0.00062 -0.000382 -0.0121 -0.000616
(0.00157) (0.00115) (0.0272) (0.0012) (0.0357) (0.0108)
Share of SC
Population in
1991
-1.70e-05* 1.13E-05 -0.000379** 6.94e-05*** 0.000664 0.000754***
(9.03E-06) (7.83E-06) (0.000187) (2.39E-05) (0.000809) (0.000283)
Observations 269,257 269,257 178,329 178,329 178,329 178,329
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.028 0.007 0.04 0.03
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Block Block Block Block Block Block
Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4.6 Business sector and patronage
Table 4.7 shows that political reservation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the rent-seeking sectors
(gas and water) and no eﬀect on other sectors. Number of SC ﬁrms in gas and water sector are
higher in reserved SC constituencies as compared to the general/counterfactual constituen-
cies. The column 4 shows that political reservation increases the SCs ownership in gas sector.
In India, gas distribution is a monopolised business. In 2005, there are around one gas distri-
bution agent at every constituency. Because of monopoly, this sector has a place for political
patronage. The column 6 shows that political reservation increases the SCs ownership in the
water sector. Private water tanker business is a highly proﬁtable business, the price of tanker
water is many times higher than pipe-water provided government. In severe water shortages
period, the private tankers supply water from rural areas to auent customers in urban areas
(Srinivasan et al., 2010). In developing countries, private water tanker business is classiﬁed
under small-scale service providers. This sector subject to excessive political interference and
corruption. Water extraction often lead over-exploitation of groundwater resources (Lovei
and Whittington, 1991; Tan, 2015). In India, water tanker business required a license and
there are strict rules to follow where to extract water and what is the limit. Some water
tankers operate without a license, and they do not follow the rules (Janakarajan et al., 2006;
Shah, 2007).
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Table 4.8 shows that political reservation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the rent-seeking sectors
(gas and water) and no eﬀect on other sectors. Number of employees in SC owned ﬁrms
in gas and water sectors are higher in reserved constituencies as compared to the general
counterfactual constituencies. The results in table 4.7 are echoed here.
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Table 4.9 shows that political reservation has no eﬀect in the business of Non-SC en-
trepreneurs across sectors. The number of non-SC ﬁrms have not declined or increased in
the reserved constituencies. Higher private tanker business is a sign of failure in public water
services and lack of water management. Column 6, shows there is no overall increase in water
tanker business. Thus, prove that public goods delivery is not aﬀected by reservation.
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Table 4.10 shows that political reservation has no eﬀect in the business of Non-SC en-
trepreneurs across sectors, except in the sector, wholesale, retail trade, restaurants, and
hotels. The employment of non-SC ﬁrms in wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels
sector is higher in reserved constituencies than the general constituencies, the statistically
signiﬁcant at 10 percent. Since it is a large informal sector, the rise of the informal sector
could be interpreted as a negligible negative impact due to the reservation.
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4.4.7 Caste and employment
Table 4.11 shows that political reservation has no eﬀects on owners' preference in hiring
members of their caste. Table 4.1 results have based the ﬁrms with more than one employee.
The expected results of political reservation is that SC owners are able to hire labor from
other castes and non-SC entrepreneurs hire SC labor. Column 1 and 2 show that coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcant and are an unexpected sign. The eﬀect of reservation on SC ﬁrms did not
lead to hiring more non-SC laborers, and the coeﬃcient is negative (See column 2). Column
3 and four also show that coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant and are an unexpected sign. The
eﬀect of reservation on non-SC ﬁrms did not lead to hiring more SC labour.
Table 4.11: Eﬀect of SC reservation on ﬁrms' hiring patterns
SC ﬁrms Non-SC ﬁrms
SC employment Non-SC employment SC employment Non-SC employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SC Reservation -0.0152 0.0152 0.00478 -0.00478
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.00435) (0.00435)
SC Population in 2001 0.00125*** -0.00125*** 0.00102*** -0.00102***
(0.000444) (0.000444) (0.000135) (0.000135)
Observations 8,220 8,220 77,031 77,031
R-squared 0.194 0.194 0.065 0.065
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Block Block Block Block
Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
88
4.4.8 Intra-village eﬀect
The table 4.12 attempt to conﬁrm that is there an intra-village eﬀect of SCs reservation.
The empirical expectation is that leaders could favor only to villages which have share of
SCs population. The results presented in the table 12 conﬁrms that there is no evidence of
intra-village eﬀect.
Table 4.12: Intra-village eﬀect of SC reservation on the private sector, SCs participation and overall economic
growth
Firm Employment
Total SC Share of
SC
Total SC Share of
SC
Light
GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SC reserved -0.115 0.0812 -0.324 0.904 0.173 -0.32 -0.0876
(2.207) (0.299) (0.413) (5.069) (0.544) (0.411) (0.177)
Share of SC Pop-
ulation in 1991
-0.108*** 0.0756*** 0.385*** -0.196*** 0.121*** 0.373*** 0.00524**
-0.0289 -0.0104 -0.0143 -0.0602 -0.0158 -0.0142 -0.00257
SC reserved*SC
Population in
1991
0.00986 0.0017 0.00801 0.0561 0.0139 0.00814 -0.00107
(0.0419) (0.0155) (0.0209) (0.0967) (0.0272) (0.0205) (0.00381)
Observations 269,257 269,257 269,257 269,257 269,257 269,257 256,660
R-squared 0.123 0.069 0.182 0.037 0.008 0.164 0.259
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Block Block Block Block Block Block Block
Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4.9 Public sector
Though the primary object of the paper is to examine the eﬀect of political reservation in
the private sector. Presence of public sector in the reserved constituencies is advantageous
to the SCs. Because Indian constitution guarantees job for SCs in the public-sector ﬁrms.
The empirical expectation is that SC leaders favor their caste by bringing more public-sector
ﬁrms to their constituencies. Table 4.13 shows that reservation has no eﬀects on the public
sector.
Table 4.13: Eﬀect of SC reservation on the public sector
Firm Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SC reserved 0.0135 -0.0226 -0.337 -0.217
(0.0817) (0.0934) (0.547) (0.841)
Share of SC Population in 1991 -0.00316*** -0.00393** -0.0144 -0.0118
(0.00105) (0.00155) (0.0142) (0.0269)
SC reserved*SC Population in 1991 0.00149 -0.00493
-0.00206 -0.0276
Observations 269,257 269,257 269,257 269,257
R-squared 0.134 0.134 0.011 0.011
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Block Block Block Block
Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusions
The main ﬁnding of this paper shows that SC political leaders' preference in the constituency
cause patronage in the rent-seeking sectors but do not promote their castes in the private
non-agricultural sectors. The empirical expectation of this paper is that SC leaders act in
favour of SC in areas where SC are excluded. In the private non-agriculture sector, SC have
low ownership and low employment, and there is noticeable underperformance of SC ﬁrms in
various scale measures. In the future Indian economy, the private non-agriculture sectors are
the livelihood for majorities of Indian families. Exclusion of SC in the private non-agricultural
sectors is a sign of social imbalance in the transforming Indian economy. This paper is not
arguing that SC leaders' lack of preference in the constituency works represents a failure in
establishing political quotas. It could be that leaders do not inﬂuence business outcomes as
the result of the following factors: SC leaders' priorities are not on the business outcomes;
vote seeking behaviour; and that they have limited instruments at their disposal to inﬂuence
overall business outcomes.
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